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Abstract 
The goal of this study is to offer senior decision-makers a useful framework to 
evaluate, articulate, and recommend modifications of the government’s bid protest 
policy to improve procurement outcomes. Most countries allow disappointed bidders 
to protest public procurement decisions as an oversight mechanism to minimize 
fraud and errors by procurement officials. The expectation is that allowing bid 
protests increases transparency and accountability and encourages competition, 
reducing the cost of public purchases. A key contribution of this study is to add an 
economics dimension to a bid protest process that is mostly thought of in legal 
terms. The economics approach suggests firms are likely to use the protest process 
strategically to improve their competitive bargaining position and will be equally 
strategic in their decision to protest an award. The conclusion is that a firm’s 
responsibility to its shareholders can lead it to undertake protests for reasons 
substantially different from, and fundamentally opposed to, the government’s 
objectives. The economics approach suggests minimizing the risk of protests that 
result in cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance gaps, while preserving 
the benefits offered by protests to promote competition and ensure the integrity, 
transparency, and accountability of the procurement process. Adopting an 
economics perspective reveals two other crucial insights: firms can exploit protests 
to extract concessions (Fed Mail), and risk-averse officials can overreact in attempts 
to achieve protest-proof procurements (Buy-offs).  In recognizing costs as well as 
benefits of a protest system, the economics approach invites a review of alternative 
portfolios of governance mechanisms that complement bid protests (internal audits, 
external audits, independent investigations, alternative dispute resolution, increased 
training and incentives, etc.), to improve procurement outcomes. 
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Executive Summary 
The goal of this study was to offer senior decision-makers a useful framework 
and perspective to evaluate, articulate, and recommend modifications of the 
government’s bid protest policy to improve procurement outcomes.A key contribution 
is to add an economics dimension to a process that is mostly thought of in legal 
terms.  
The legal and regulatory literature that underpins the current protest system 
reflects two fundamental beliefs. Protests (a) deter fraud and errors in government 
procurements and (b) promote competition. This study explores the first premise 
through the economist’s “principal-agent” framework and explores the second with 
the aid of a representative bidder model. The aim is to examine opportunities to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the protest process in order to enhance 
performance, cost, and schedule outcomes of defense acquisition investments.  
In economics, there is no such thing as a “free lunch.” Operating a protest 
system is costly. The substantial costs of protests to the military departments are a 
significant challenge. This is reflected in the U.S. Air Force’s recent experience 
selecting a vendor for the KC-X aerial tanker.  
Along with the well-documented benefits of allowing firms to protest public 
procurements come significant opportunity and transaction costs. The goal can be 
stated as follows: Reduce the risk of protests of critical acquisitions that result in 
significant cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance gaps, while preserving 
the benefits offered by protests to promote competition and ensure the integrity, 
transparency, and accountability of the procurement process.  
Adopting an economics perspective reveals two other crucial insights: first, 
firms can exploit protests as a strategic bargaining tool; second, governments can 
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significantly impact acquisitions. Combined, they substantially increase risks of 
delays and cost-overruns. 
Fortunately, fighting agency errors and corruption and promoting competition 
can be done in other ways. The economics approach encourages senior leadership 
to identify and evaluate alternatives to protests that could achieve similar results at a 
lower cost. Acknowledging the substantial costs of operating a protest system to 
govern procurements and encourage competition is one of the key insights of the 
study: There exists an “optimum” rate of protests. The optimum rate of protests 
offers the most efficient and effective way to encourage competition and ensure the 
integrity of the acquisition process while guaranteeing the best possible outcomes 
for our troops and taxpayers.  
Although it is not easy to locate this optimum, it is possible to identify and 
evaluate policies that  approach the optimum. One important implication is that a 
simple, often-stated department objective such as “reducing the rate of successful 
protests” is not always appropriate. Two additional factors need to be considered. 
The first is to identify where the department is relative to the optimum. The second 
involves a careful consideration of how the department might choose to reduce 
protests. By recognizing the costs as well as the benefits of a protest system, the 
economics approach invites a review of portfolios of governance mechanisms 
(internal audits, external audits, independent investigations, ADR, integrity pacts, 
training, incentives, etc.) that can substitute for (or complement) protests to improve 
procurement outcomes.  
If a military department finds itself in a situation in which it experiences 
contract challenges above the optimum rate, then the burden of protests outweighs 
the benefits and reducing the rate of protests is appropriate. This can be 
accomplished in two ways: by reducing the expected benefits of a protest to a 
“disappointed bidder” (including by enabling the protester to achieve desired 
outcomes through other means) or by increasing the expected costs. This is a 
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If a military department is below the optimum rate, then the benefits of 
protests outweigh the extra (opportunity and transaction) costs. In this range, while 
reducing protests might appear to have positive short-run impacts, it could be at the 
expense of long-term benefits such as preserving the integrity of the procurement 
system and encouraging future competition. Remarkably, this report reveals two 
important cases that demonstrate that even in this range, it is possible to reduce 
protests and improve long-term outcomes. The key is to carefully consider how the 
department reduces protests.  
This study captures insights from the protest literature, offers a brief overview 
of the primary U.S. protest process administered by the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), and discusses alternative governance mechanisms. Woven 
throughout are data, examples, and survey results. Two economic frameworks are 
introduced—the principal-agent model (agency theory) and a representative bidder 
model. These frameworks reveal two sets of potential change candidates to reduce 
the risk of protests: factors that reduce the expected benefits to a losing bidder of a 
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I. Introduction 
If those affected by the breach of rules cannot protest in a meaningful way, 
the rules have no teeth, and competition is stifled. Without the constraints of 
bid protests, government contracts will be let based on favoritism…and 
bribery—as they were before the system was initiated. (Weckstein & Love, 
1995) 
This study examines opportunities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the protest process in order to enhance the performance, cost, and schedule 
outcomes of defense acquisition investments. The goal is to offer senior decision-
makers a useful framework and perspective that allows them to evaluate, articulate, 
and prescribe protest policy recommendations that improve procurement outcomes.   
As expressed in the introductory quotation, the legal and regulatory literature 
that underpins the current protest system reflects (a) fundamental doubts about 
whether government officials will exercise proper discretion to the benefit of 
taxpayers, and (b) a belief that protests promote competition to the benefit of our 
troops and taxpayers (for example, see Arrowsmith, Linarelli, & Wallace, 2000; 
Gordon, 2006; Metzger & Lyons, 2007; Troff, 2005). This study explores the first 
premise through the economist’s “principal-agent” framework and explores the 
second with the aid of a representative bidder model. 
According to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), a protest is defined 
as: 
a written objection by an interested party to any of the following: (1) A 
solicitation … by an agency for offers for a contract for the procurement of 
property or services, (2) The cancellation of the solicitation … (3) An award or 
proposed award of the contract, (4) A termination or cancellation of an award 
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A distribution of the relative frequency of protests over these four categories 
would reveal that the majority of protests involve “an award or proposed award of the 
contract,” which is the primary focus of this study.1 
An underlying hypothesis in the literature is that protests play an important 
role as a credible, decentralized oversight mechanism for the acquisition process, 
and that this helps deter procurement errors, fraud, and favoritism, which in turn 
makes firms more willing and able to compete for government contracts since they 
are less likely to be excluded for spurious reasons. The presumption that follows is 
that since competitive markets offer better performance, faster schedules, and 
cheaper costs, a bid protest process that increases competition can improve 
procurement outcomes.2 A key pillar of the federal government’s protest process—
the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA)—is largely based on this premise.3   
However, the protest process can also be abused to restrict competition.4 
                                            
1 This study has this primary purpose in part because this category involves the most time and 
financial investments by the agency, and in part because bid protests at this stage have a significant 
impact on the acquisition process. 
2 The economist’s “transaction costs” literature questions this assumption, especially when ex-ante 
competition leads to ex-post monopoly power. The risk is that a winning “foot-in-the-door strategy” 
later leads to a “hold-up,” in which the winning firm makes up any losses from its low initial bid 
through change orders, etc. (see Melese, Franck, Angelis, & Dillard,  2007) A related piece of 
literature on “contestable markets” argues that low entry barriers (the degree of asset specificity, the 
ease of re-competing the contract, etc.) are more important than the number of competitors in 
obtaining competitive market outcomes (Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, 1982). Because a stated goal of 
the protest system is to increase vendor participation in procurements (Arrowsmith et. al., 2000), this 
could be an interesting avenue for future research.  
3 Along with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR Parts 5, 10, 12-15, and 33), the Tucker Act, Title 
28, Section 1491 of the U.S. Code, Executive Order No. 12979, Agency Procurement Protests, and 
various case law precedents, the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 (Title 31 of the U.S. 
Code Sections 3551-3556) is a key pillar of the protest process. The CICA completed the foundation 
for the modern bid protest structure. The CICA reflects a strong presumption that government 
purchasing agencies should use competitive procurement techniques to increase opportunities for 
firms to compete for contract awards. Today, one of the guiding principles of CICA and the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is to promote competition for government contracts. The CICA laid the 
foundation for the existing bid protest system. In the CICA, Congress expressly codified the authority 
of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to adjudicate procurement protests by disappointed 
bidders or prospective bidders. Congress directed that “to the maximum extent practicable, the 
Comptroller General (at GAO) shall provide for the inexpensive and expeditious resolution of 
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A fundamental challenge identified by the procuring agencies is the significant 
costs that protests impose on the department. This is reflected in the recent 
selection of a vendor for the new KC-X aerial refueling tanker.5 The Defense 
Department’s aim is to reduce the risk of protests of critical acquisitions that result in 
significant cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance gaps, while preserving 
benefits offered by the protest system to promote competition and ensure the 
integrity, transparency, and accountability of the procurement process. An important 
contribution of this study is to add an economics dimension to a process mostly 
thought of in legal terms. 
In economics, there is no such thing as a “free lunch.” Operating a protest 
system is costly. The well-documented advantages of allowing firms to protest 
public procurements also introduce significant opportunity costs and 
transaction costs. For instance, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
reports that “many … acquisition professionals are concerned that bid 
protests can delay contract awards … costing millions of dollars [and] 
preventing government from getting the goods and services it needs when it 
needs them” (Schwartz & Manuel, 2009, p. 8). 
Coined by latest recent Nobel Prize winner in economics, Dr. Oliver 
Williamson, the term transaction costs includes any non-production-related 
                                                                                                                                       
inexpensive alternative to formal judicial proceedings. Today the vast majority of protests are filed 
with the GAO, and that is the principal focus of this study. Over a five-year period from FY2003–2007, 
6,931 cases were filed with the GAO—an average of 1,386 per year—while only 328 were filed with 
the Court of Federal Claims (CFC)—an average of 66 per year (GAO and CFC statistics from 
Schaengold, Guiffré, & Gill, 2009, p. 255). 
4 For example, in GTSI Corp. v. Wildflower International, Inc., Case No. 1:09cv123 (JCC), 
memorandum op. at 15, (E.D.Va. Jul. 17, 2009), a Federal district court held that a valid conspiracy 
claim may exist where a contractor allegedly tried to “punish” a competitor by organizing a campaign 
to file “baseless” bid protests.   
5 “In FY2008, a single and politically charged protested procurement (the Boeing Company’s 
challenge of a contract awarded by the Air Force to Northrop Grumman for a new fleet of aerial 
refueling tankers) generated unprecedented interest in the DoD acquisition process” (Joint Analysis 
Team [JAT], 2009, p.1). The current interest in reviewing the bid protest process is largely due to 
several high-value, high-visibility protests recently sustained by the GAO (e.g., the combined value of 
the contracts for the contested aerial refueling tanker [KC-X] and Combat Search & Rescue 
Replacement Helicopter [CSAR-X] is approximately $65 billion). There is an extensive body of 
literature that discusses the KC-X and other critical programs that have been subjected to protests 
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contracting costs such as the costs of negotiating, monitoring, and managing 
transactions, and the risk of opportunism (see Melese et al., 2007, and Williamson 
1971, 1985, 1979, 1999). Whereas a protest process offers the benefits of an 
oversight mechanism, it also involves significant opportunity costs and transaction 
costs. For example, in an August 2007 memo, then-Acting Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics John Young wrote,  
Protests are extremely detrimental to the warfighter and the taxpayer. These 
protest actions consume vast amounts of time [i.e., opportunity costs] of 
acquisition, legal, and requirements team members; [and] delay program 
initiation and the delivery of capability [i.e., transaction costs]. (Schwartz & 
Manuel, 2009, p. 8) 
The economics approach would encourage senior leadership to identify and 
evaluate alternatives to protests that might achieve similar benefits at lower costs. 
Adopting an economics perspective would reveal two other crucial insights—
each an unintended consequence that further increases the costs of a protest 
system. First, protests can be exploited by firms as a strategic bargaining tool, 
resulting in situations in which private gains defeat the public interest. Second, 
governments can overreact (with a consequent risk of ballooning transaction costs 
from over-deterrence) to avoid protests.6   The government’s goal of fighting agency 
errors and corruption and promoting competition can be done in other ways. By 
recognizing the potential costs as well as benefits of a protest system, the 
economics approach considers alternative governance mechanisms (internal audits, 
external audits, independent investigations, GAO advisory opinions and technical 
assistance under title 31 section 526 and 717, ADR, investments in training and 
                                            
6 Government agencies can overreact by tacitly condoning the protest in various ways, from failure to 
manage the protest process in a businesslike fashion through dispute resolution flexibilities, 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), and all available legal defenses, or from litigation strategies 
aimed at “buying” a GAO or judicial validation of agency decisions at the expense of the program.  In 
the alternative, government agencies may be trying to excessively protest-proof their procurement to 
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incentives, greater use of Executive Order No. 12979 ADR measures, etc.) that can 
substitute for (or complement) protests and improve procurement outcomes.7  
Acknowledging the significant costs of operating a protest system to govern 
the procurement process and encourage competition yields one of the key insights 
of this study: There exists an optimum rate (and type) of protests. In combination 
with a portfolio of other initiatives (audits, investigations, etc.), the optimum rate of 
protests offers the most efficient and effective way to ensure the integrity of the 
acquisition process, while guaranteeing the best possible procurement outcomes for 
our troops and taxpayers.8 
While it is not easy to locate this optimum, the economics approach attempts 
to identify and evaluate policies that could move us closer to the optimum. One 
important implication is that a simple, often-stated objective of contracting officials, 
such as “reducing the rate of successful protests,” is not always appropriate. 9 Two 
additional factors need to be considered. The first is to identify where the department 
is relative to the optimum. The second involves a careful consideration of how the 
department might choose to reduce and manage protests.10  
                                            
7 For example, a comparison of protests and audits suggests that “protests are a more powerful 
oversight mechanism, but that they have more adverse side effects. Audits are apt to result in the 
review of more properly conducted procurements. But protests result in fedmail, buy-offs and 
overdeterrence. … [The] supervision of protest settlement reduces harm from buy-offs and fedmail. 
Similarly, the poor selection of cases by audit could be improved by making the auditor responsive to 
complaints by bidders. [I]t may be appropriate to use audits and protest simultaneously” (MMR, 1991, 
pp. 10–11). Audits, however, involve substantial investments in qualified workforce (e.g., the staffs of 
the Defense Contract Audit Agency, the Offices of Inspector General, or congressional oversight 
committees) because the auditors must be able to survey, detect, and resolve a pool of contracts that 
may be greater in scope than the number of cases protested.   
8 Roughly speaking, the optimum is when the incremental social costs (in terms of extra delays and 
cost overruns) of additional protests outweigh the social benefits of those protests (to deter corruption 
and promote competition, ensuring procurement process integrity).  
 
9 For example, a recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report states, “This report contains 
options for Congress related to minimizing the number of protests” (Schwartz & Manuel, 2009, p. 1). 
10 Much of the protest literature suggests that limiting protests would threaten competition, thus 
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If the Department of Defense finds itself above the optimum, then extra 
opportunity costs and transaction costs associated with protests tend to 
overwhelm the procurement process—i.e., by increasing delays and 
contributing to cost overruns and performance gaps. This is reflected in a 
recent statement that “The delay of contract award … triggered by a GAO 
protest … has … prompted concerns about the potential impact of protests 
upon government agency operations, especially in the Department of 
Defense (DoD).”Schwartz & Manuel, 2009, p. 1). 
If a procuring activity is above the optimum rate of protests, then reducing the 
rate of protests is an appropriate objective so the burden does not outweigh the 
benefits. This can be accomplished in two ways: by reducing the expected benefits 
of a protest to a “disappointed bidder” (including by creating alternative mechanisms 
to address protester’s concerns) or by increasing the expected costs.11  
In contrast, if the procuring activity is below the optimum rate, then the overall 
benefits of the protests outweigh the extra (opportunity and transaction) costs. In this 
range, while reducing the rate of protests might appear to have positive short-run 
impacts for the activity, it could be at the expense of greater long-term benefits, such 
as preserving the integrity of the public procurement system and encouraging future 
competition. Remarkably, this study reveals two important cases that demonstrate 
                                                                                                                                       
successful protests might reduce the direct costs of protests to the procuring agency, but it would 
raise new indirect costs from reduced competition.  In contrast to the existing literature, this study 
suggests that the net effect on competition of limiting protests is an empirical question. This raises the 
possibility that carefully limiting certain kinds of protests could actually increase competition. 
Identifying and mitigating conditions that trigger protests could actually increase competition, or 
reduce risk premiums that may be implicitly charged by contractors to the government as part of bids 
or offers to hedge against protests. 
11 This is a critical distinction emphasized in this study. The representative bidder model developed in 
Section III offers an illustration. It highlights the key differences in front of a prospective bidder (or 
offeror) who is faced with policies that limit protests either by reducing the expected benefits of a 
protest or by increasing the expected costs. A related problem is when the agency does not resolve 
the protest in a way that is optimal for the particular procurement program at issue.  For instance, if 
an agency needlessly consents to a stay of the procurement and then takes excessive corrective 
action by cancelling a competition in its entirety instead of making minor changes or brief re-
evaluation of a contract award, the protester would receive inappropriate benefits from the protest.  
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that even in this range, it is possible to reduce protests and improve long-term 
outcomes. The key is to carefully consider how the department reduces protests.12   
This study follows the basic outline of strategic planning. The next section 
(Background) answers the question, where are we? Section III (An Economic 
Protest Framework and Change Candidates) answers the question, where do we 
want to go? Finally, Section IV (Summary and Policy Recommendations) answers 
the question, how do we get there?  
Section II consists of two parts: a review of insights from the existing protest 
literature, and a brief review of the protest process along with alternative governance 
mechanisms. Woven throughout this section is a discussion of data and survey 
results. Section III consists of three parts: an economic framework (representative 
bidder model),13 and two sets of change candidates suggested by the model to 
                                            
12 In general, if the procuring agency finds itself below the optimum, more protests are warranted 
since added oversight contributes to the integrity of the procurement process and encourages 
competition. In fact, much of the existing legal and regulatory literature implicitly assumes procuring 
agencies are below the optimum. This makes it appear somewhat counterintuitive that reducing 
protests could actually increase competition since the literature focuses on how reducing protests 
creates the risk of reducing the participation of losing bidders. However, as discussed in Section II, 
the trick is to reduce protests in such a way that it encourages sufficient additional competition by 
reducing the burden on prospective winning bidders of defending their awards in order to more than 
offset the loss of participation of prospective losing bidders. 
13 A two-player game model is being developed by members of the NPS Protest Project team that 
allows for shared awards (split buys). Split-buy remedies are consistent with statutes restricting 
bundling or consolidation of government contracts, such as the Competition in Contracting Act, 10 
U.S.C. § 2304; the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 631, et. seq.; and the Consolidation of Contract 
Requirements law, 10 U.S.C. § 2382.  They are also consistent with defense industrial base statutes, 
such as 10 U.S.C.§§ 2501-2507. Split buys must be carefully structured if the goal is to reduce bid 
protests while simultaneously promoting competition and encouraging efficiency and operational 
effectiveness for our troops and taxpayers. The proposal is for the contract split to depend on the 
relative value of the contract offers, with the winner receiving a larger split (i.e., share of the 
procurement) the greater the difference between the highest and second highest valued contractor. If 
the second-best offer is close to the best offer, then the contract split would be close to 50:50. If 
structured correctly, such a split strategy has the potential to retain the benefits of competition by 
encouraging contractors to submit proposals that reflect what they view as the best government 
value. Contract shares could be adjusted over time to reward contract performance and cost savings 
from process and product innovation. Finally, split buys increase competition for follow-on contracts 
since they preserve multiple procurement sources. This approach to protests deserves more careful 
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reduce the risk of protests—factors that reduce the expected benefits to a losing 
bidder of a protest, and factors that raise the expected costs. Section IV summarizes 
those factors (or change candidates) and suggests approaches to improve the 
acquisition process and procurement outcomes with an application to the KC-X 
aerial refueling tanker competition. The study concludes with a list of policy 
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II. Background and New Insights  
Most of the legal and regulatory literature on bid protests focuses on the 
benefits of a protest system.14 Much less is written about the costs.15 This section 
takes a more balanced view.  
Bid protest systems are designed as decentralized, vendor-driven governance 
mechanisms to improve public-sector contracting outcomes.16 Because a significant 
fraction of public expenditures goes to acquiring goods and services,17 the theory is 
that allowing vendors to challenge public procurements offers relatively inexpensive 
oversight of the procurement process, promoting integrity, transparency, and 
accountability and encouraging competition. A popular argument is that a protest 
system spurs competition by reducing entry barriers that arise from a perception of 
government biases, errors, and favoritism, thereby improving procurement 
outcomes. This argument appears in a recent report to Congress by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO): “The availability of a strong bid protest mechanism 
promotes competition in the procurement system by providing contractors a 
                                            
14 The opening quotation of the Introduction offers an excellent example. The primary concerns 
expressed in the literature are to ensure the integrity (probity) and equity of the public procurement 
process. The former “involve[s] two aspects: first, preventing actual corruption—such as bribery, or 
the award of contracts based on personal interest—and second, securing the appearance of probity 
… ensuring that suppliers and the general public have confidence in the procurement process” 
(Arrowsmith et al., 2000, p. 32). Equity refers to the equal treatment of providers to promote 
competition and ensure that vendors are not arbitrarily excluded from government business. 
15 Two important exceptions are Marshall, Meurer, and Richard (1991)  and Metzger and Lyons 
(2007). 
16 Another goal of allowing protests, expressed by the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement 
on Government Procurement and by various Memoranda of Understanding between the Department 
of Defense and foreign governments, concerns reciprocal access to each country’s defense contracts 
in order to minimize discrimination against foreign suppliers in domestic government purchases.  This 
goal is a legally binding obligation of the U.S. government that may not be circumvented.  Yet another 
goal of the protest system is to fulfill constitutional rights guaranteed under the First Amendment’s 
redress-of-grievances clause and the Fifth Amendment’s due-process clause. 
17 “According to USAspending.gov, between FY2001 and FY2008, the value of contract actions 
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measure of confidence that concerns regarding potentially unfair treatment may be 
addressed in a neutral forum” (Kepplinger, 2009b, p. 14). 
In general, a protest can relate to either the conduct of a procurement prior to 
selecting a winner (i.e., in the acquisition strategy or the solicitation: Invitation for Bid 
[IFB], Request for Proposal [RFP], or Request for Quotation [RFQ]),18 determining 
the competitive range, or selecting the winner. Pre-award protests typically argue 
that some aspect of the solicitation unfairly disadvantaged the protesting company. 
Post-award protests generally argue that a procurement activity or official acted 
improperly and that this prejudiced the losing protesting bidder or offeror.19 Post-
award protests are the primary focus of this study (Gordon, 2006, p. 2).  
                                            
18 An agency generally develops a solicitation that identifies what the agency wants to buy, advertises 
the solicitation, identifies the method for evaluating offers, and sets a deadline for the submission of 
bids or proposals. The agency then evaluates the bids or proposals based on the criteria set forth in 
the solicitation and awards the contract to the winning firm (Schwartz & Manuel, 2009, p. 2). An IFB 
begins with an announcement of mandatory specifications. The award is then made to the vendor 
that satisfies the specifications and offers the lowest price in a sealed-bid competition. The RFP lists 
desirable specifications and assigns points to offers that contain those features. A winning bid is often 
determined by summing the points for technical merit and then choosing the proposal that offers the 
best value in terms of cost and performance/schedule. The scoring function assigns weights to cost 
and different quality attributes. Unlike an IFB, a proposal submitted by a firm is not necessarily its final 
offer. Often, the agency conducts written or oral negotiations with all responsible offerors within a 
competitive range determined by the Procurement Official (PO). (For the purposes of this paper, the 
term Procurement Official encompasses Contracting Officers, Senior Procurement Executives, and 
others with procurement authority). During this time, the PO gives offerors an opportunity to correct 
deficiencies and clarify ambiguities. Firms in the competitive range revise their offers and submit 
“Best and Final Offers.” POs exercise substantial discretion in determining specifications and 
evaluation criteria. (This study will often use the terms bid and offer interchangeably.) 
19 The issue of prejudice is central once a protester convinces a forum that the agency acted 
improperly. Prejudice refers to the harm the protester suffered from the agency’s improper action. If a 
substantial weight is placed on prejudice, then even if an agency acted improperly, a protest can still 
be denied if the improper actions did not prejudice the protesting vendor, i.e., had no impact on their 
chances to win the competition (Gordon, 2006, p. 11). This would be an example of a meritorious 
protest denied for lack of prejudice. By sustaining protests only if a protester was prejudiced (i.e., 
could have won the competition), the tribunal is able to ensure that agencies are not told to redo 
procurements based on mere technicalities. The alternative is for a review forum like the GAO to 
leave agencies complaining that protests are sustained on technicalities that would have had no 
bearing on the selection of a contractor. Whereas hearing protests from those who were not 
prejudiced  might shine the light on parts of the procurement system that need improvement,  doing 
so might also significantly increase transaction costs. In this case, procurement officials would be 
forced to practice a form of “defensive medicine,” using up valuable resources to avoid even the hint 
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The literature generally focuses on two players: a disappointed bidder20 and 
the government. In fact, the government can be broken into several distinct players, 
each of which might expect a challenge from a disappointed bidder: procurement 
officials (POs) and their department or activity, the quasi-judicial Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), and the Court of Federal Claims (COFC). 
Other key stakeholders occasionally overlooked in the protest literature 
include other bidders (especially the “winning bidder,” eager to defend the award), 
our troops (who ultimately stand to benefit from the procurement), and taxpayers 
(who foot the bill).21  The aim of this study is to represent the best interests of the last 
two players: our troops and the taxpayers. The report investigates the protest 
process with the aim of identifying opportunities to enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of government procurements in order to obtain the greatest (troop) 
value for (taxpayer) money.22 
                                                                                                                                       
threat of a protest as a bargaining tool. These two concerns are discussed in more detail in Chapters 
II A and B . In contrast, audits as accountability measures are focused primarily on compliance and 
do not have an independent mechanism of measuring prejudice.  While audits may reduce costs for a 
particular transaction, they can also increase costs because of this lack of focus on prejudice. 
20 Other terms besides disappointed bidder found in the literature include disappointed offeror, 
unsuccessful offeror, excluded offeror, and interested party. For the purposes of this study, these 
terms are used interchangeably and basically refer to a company that has standing, or is allowed to 
protest the solicitation or award of a contract. “Interested party … means an actual or prospective 
offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of a contract” (FAR, Subpart 
33.101—Definitions). 
21 In an article entitled “Constructing a Bid Protest Process: Choices Every Procurement Challenge 
System Must Make,” Daniel Gordon (2006) focuses on four principal parties: the disappointed offeror 
who is denied a contract award or the potential offeror who is excluded from competition, the 
acquiring agency, the public at large and their elected representatives, and an intervening offeror or 
successful awardee.   Each has a different objective in resolving the protest. The unsuccessful offeror 
seeks a forum to air complaints, to learn as much information as possible about the denial or 
exclusion of their offer, and, ultimately, to obtain some type of meaningful relief.  The acquiring 
agency seeks to resolve the protest in a way that minimizes the impact on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the acquisition process.  The public seeks a resolution that promotes the integrity, 
transparency, and accountability of the acquisition system. The successful awardee (or intervening 
offeror) seeks a resolution that supports the original award (Gordon, 2006, p. 4). 
 
22 “The federal procurement system was designed by Congress to leverage maximum public benefit 
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This section consists of two parts: a review of insights from (and gaps in) the 
literature, and a brief description of the protest process. Woven throughout this 
section is a discussion of data, legal authorities, the protest process, the literature, 
and some survey results.23  
A. A Review of Insights from the Literature 
Whereas the most common term, and the term used in this study, is bid 
protest, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) refers to reviews, while the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 
Agreement on Government Procurement uses the term challenges (see 
generally, Gordon, 2006). As stated in the U.N. Commission on International 
Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement     of Goods, Construction 
and Services, chap VI, Guide to Enactment, (1994 p.30) “A review process … 
helps to make [acquisition regulations] to an important degree self-policing 
and self-enforcing, since it provides an avenue for review to … contractors, 
who have a natural interest in monitoring compliance [of procurement law] by 
procuring entities” (UNCITRAL, 1994, p. 30). 
A key feature of protests that differentiates them from other methods of 
policing government procurements (audits, investigations, etc.) is that they serve as 
a decentralized oversight mechanism. Disappointed bidders serve as “private 
attorneys general” in the sense that they direct the government to investigate certain 
procurements through their protests (see Marshall et al., 1991). This allows private-
sector vendors to decide where the government spends its investigative and 
oversight resources. This is in sharp contrast to traditional, centralized mechanisms 
such as audits, inspectors general, or criminal prosecutions, in which government 
officials are the ones that decide which procurements to review.24  
                                                                                                                                       
Bid protests play an important role in ensuring integrity in the federal procurement system while … 
enhancing transparency and accountability” (JAT, 2009, p. 1). 
23 Survey results were compiled by Benishek et al. (2011) and appear in a companion report, Better 
Acquisition Management through Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and Other Best Practices for 
Preventing and Resolving Bid Protests, published by the Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition 
Research Program as part of this study effort on the topic of bid protests. 
24 In terms of reducing fraud (corruption) in the solicitation or selection process, whistleblower reports 
to the Inspector General or the Justice Department are another viable de-centralized substitute for 
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Protest systems serve multiple purposes. The federal government’s protest 
process mostly focuses on deterring and correcting fraud (intentional violations of 
procurement laws and regulations) and errors (inadvertent violations of procurement 
laws and regulations) and on encouraging competition.25  
Fundamentally, bid protest systems, like audit systems, serve a procurement 
oversight function. They provide a means of monitoring the activities of 
government procurement officials, enforcing compliance with procurement 
laws and regulations, and correcting incidents of improper government action. 
… [E]nforcing compliance with procurement laws implicates not just high 
standards of integrity, but also … the maximization of competition. (Troff, 
2005, pp. 118, 120)  
Bid protests are one of several different mechanisms used by federal, state, 
and local governments and other countries around the world to increase competition 
and reduce fraud, waste, and abuse in government contracting.  
Bid protest procedures are now well-established as a key feature of every 
major national procurement regime as well as the international trade 
agreements that address government procurement—such as the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), and the European Union Procurement Directives. (Troff, 
2005, p. 129)  
Protest systems are designed to enhance the accountability of procurement 
officials and government agencies and to improve bidder participation. By allowing 
protests, the government can increase competition if this reduces barriers to entry 
created by a perception of favoritism or lack of integrity and transparency in the 
procurement process. Not only does a protest system serve as a deterrent to 
                                                                                                                                       
section 3729, potential whistleblowers might be induced to step forward if they were offered the same 
15–30% of funds recovered/saved in the procurement as may be recovered by private qui tam 
realtors. The economics approach promoted in this study suggests identifying and evaluating 
alternative governance mechanisms that achieve similar aims to a protest system at a lower cost. 
25 “Bid protest systems … are characterized by their speed and efficiency, the meaningfulness and 
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improper conduct—improving the integrity and fairness of the procurement 
process—but it can also help clarify and shape procurement law.26 
However, there is a dark side. Achieving these goals increases opportunity 
costs and transaction costs and can lead to lengthy and costly procurements.27    
A narrow goal for the Defense Department is to minimize transaction costs in 
order to promptly and efficiently complete an acquisition. This argues for limiting 
delays and disruptions from protests by reducing the expected benefits of a protest 
to a disappointed bidder, or by increasing the expected costs. 
Proposals to accomplish this have included: narrowing standing (eligibility), 
setting stricter time limits for filing protests (and for deciding them), encouraging 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), raising filing fees, setting fines for frivolous 
protests, instituting new rules such as restricting the ability to institute frequent or 
repeated protests, or establishing the loser pays method (for cases in which a 
protest has merit but is ultimately denied because the dispute involves a mere 
technicality and there is lack of prejudice).28 Although a fear generally expressed in 
                                            
26 Of course, taxpayers’ representatives in Congress often have zero tolerance in public procurement 
for certain violations, such as conflicts of interest, kickbacks, misrepresentation, and procurement 
integrity violations.  For instance, under the False Claims Act, delivery of quality products or services 
is not an allowable defense.  (see Longhi ex rel. United States v. Lithium Power, 575 F.3rd 459 (5th 
Cir. 2009).  However, it may be appropriate to consider whether all violations currently redressed 
through the protest process for all types of disappointed bidders should continue to be redressed 
through remedies that have substantial cost and delay impacts on the acquisition system 
27 “A number of high-profile government acquisitions have experienced extensive delays as a result of 
GAO bid protest decisions. For example, on Jun 18, 2008, GAO sustained Boeing’s protest of the Air 
Force’s award of a contract to Northrop Grumman [for the KC-X tanker aircraft]. … Identifying which 
protests tend to experience the longest delays—and working to minimize such delays—could help the 
government save hundreds of millions of dollars and receive the goods and services it needs when it 
needs them” (Schwartz & Manuel, 2009). 
 
28 Note that restricting the number of protests is unconstitutional on First and Fifth Amendment 
grounds. The frequently stated recommendation to limit the number of non-frivolous protests would 
violate the First Amendment right to petition the government for the redress of grievances and the 
Fifth Amendment right to due process. As noted in the companion report of Benishek et al. (2011, pp. 
110), Federal courts disfavor broad limitations on access to the legal process. For example, the 
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the legal and regulatory literature is that limiting protests will inhibit competition and 
result in higher costs,29 those costs could be more than offset by reductions in delays 
and by disruptions from fewer protests.  
In reviewing the literature, there appear to be two underappreciated risks 
(costs) associated with the operation of the current protest system. One is the 
strategic use of protests (e.g., stays, injunctions, or delays) by firms to obtain 
competitive advantage (or to recoup bid proposal costs).30 The other is the risk of 
                                                                                                                                       
731 (1983)), that a Federal agency cannot halt lawsuits brought even for improper motives unless 
those lawsuits are based on “intentional falsehoods or on knowingly frivolous claims,” or otherwise 
lack a reasonable basis. In another case, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited (404 
U.S. 508 (1972)), the Supreme Court held that Federal antitrust laws may penalize businesses 
bringing lawsuits and petitions to Federal agencies only if such petitions and lawsuits are “a mere 
sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with a business 
relationship of a competitor.”  Federal appellate courts also identified two limited ways which can 
render a legal action frivolous: “First, a legal action is considered ‘frivolous as filed’ when a plaintiff or 
appellant grounds its case on arguments or issues ‘that are beyond the reasonable contemplation of 
fair-minded people, and no basis for [the party’s position] in law or fact can be or is even arguably 
shown.’ . . . Second, a legal action is considered ‘frivolous as argued’ when a plaintiff or appellant has 
not dealt fairly with the court, has significantly misrepresented the law or facts, or has abused the 
judicial process by repeatedly litigating the same issue in the same court.” (GAO, B-401197, 2009, 
11).  However, options include agency policies requiring mandatory consideration of stay overrides, 
requiring vigorous objections, setting stricter time limits for  deciding or resolving protests, mandating 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as the default resolution mechanism, or other approaches such 
as replicating sanctions for frivolous protests available at the Court of Federal Claims in GAO 
protests, or instituting rules such as  the posting of bonds for the expenses of delays resulting from 
stays of protests that are ultimately not sustained.  In addition, the standard of review at the GAO may 
be adjusted from the more relaxed and subjective “reasonableness” standard to the “arbitrary, 
capricious, abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” standard used by the COFC 
under the Administrative Procedures Act (Choice of Forum for Federal Government Contracts Bid 
Protests, at 298 (2009). Further, agencies can be encouraged not to allow post-award bid protests 
challenging the evaluation and the conduct of source selection to result as a matter of course in pre-
award corrective actions, such as total cancellation of solicitation and full re-competition. 
29 “Attempts to disincentivize protests … may have, on balance, the unintended consequence of 
harming the federal procurement system by discouraging participation in federal contracting and, in 
turn, limiting competition” (Kepplinger, 2009, p. 12). 
30 Another strategic use of protests is so-called “fishing expeditions.” These are attempts to obtain 
valuable information about competitors, selection criteria, etc., to use in current or future 
competitions. Although issuance of protective orders are meant to prevent firms from accessing 
information from an agency or competitor that might be used to unfair advantage, it is plausible that 
information gleaned in the protest process could turn out to have significant strategic value. As 
discussed throughout the companion report, Benishek et al. (2011), better quality debriefings can play 
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over-deterrence, or a proliferation of defensive actions by procurement officials 
(POs) to avoid protests.31   
1. The Strategic Use of Protests by Firms  
Prospective bidders can use the (implicit or explicit) threat of filing a protest 
as a strategic bargaining tool in negotiations.32 This is a uniquely credible threat due 
to the significant delays that arise in disputed procurements.33 In fact, filing a protest 
with the Government Accountability Office (GAO)—the most popular forum—
guarantees an automatic stay of up to 100 days.34 
In order to avoid the threat of costly delays, procurement officials are 
understandably tempted to engage in preemptive settlements. Though a large 
number of disputes in our legal system are settled rather than litigated (Marshall et 
                                            
31 A risk is that the government’s focus (i.e., the pendulum) would shift from the execution of contracts 
to an over-emphasis on compliance, potentially harming acquisition outcomes. Another risk, 
addressed in detail in the companion report, is that agencies, in effect, may be tacitly condoning filing 
and litigation of bid protests in order to purchase a seal of approval or obtain authoritative direction 
from the GAO (see Benishek et al., 2011, p. 69). 
 
32 The concern over frivolous protests may also be relevant for tactical reasons as a protestor 
strategy to reveal key information for current or future competitions. The risk of abuse could motivate 
raising filing fees, punishing vendors that file frivolous protests, or compelling unsuccessful protestors 
to reimburse the government (and awardee) for the cost of defending against the protests. The 
danger is that disappointed bidders with legitimate issues might be deterred, fearing the contracting 
agency might retaliate in future competitions. These concerns could be examined by setting up 
Statistical Hypothesis tests and exploring Type I and Type II errors. 
  
33 In the companion report presenting a recent NPS survey of acquisition officials, 70% (14/20 
participants) responded that strategic behavior by disappointed offerors was at least a moderate 
aspect that precluded the effective avoidance or resolution of bid protests (see Benishek et al., 2011, 
pp.71–72 ). The GAO is aware of the risk of delays: “Despite the variability in protest filings from one 
year to the next, our Office minimizes the delay and disruption associated with protest filings by 
resolving protests as expeditiously as practicable. In fact, during the last 5 years, we have 
consistently closed more than half of all DOD protests within 30 days of when they were filed” 
(Kepplinger, 2009b, p. 10). 
34 “The filing of a GAO protest … triggers an automatic stay of contract award or performance that can 
interrupt agencies’ procurement initiatives for as long as the protest is pending” (Schwartz & Manuel, 
2009, p. 3). Note that the alternative bid protest forum, the Court of Federal Claims (CFC), has much 
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al., 1991),35 so-called Fed-mail and Buy-off settlements made to avoid protests can 
be both subtle and costly.36 They include anything from subtly restructuring 
solicitations in order to discriminate for or against certain vendors, to guaranteeing 
future work or subcontracts, to the payment of “consulting” fees or other forms of 
cash payments.  
Bid protest disputes often give rise to significant operational delays. 
Sometimes, rather than litigate the bid protest, and then correct the flaws in 
its procurement, an activity will try to “buy off” a bid protester with a monetary 
settlement. This practice is known as “Fedmail”.37 (Office of the General 
Counsel, 2004, p. 4-83) 
Roughly speaking, it is useful to think of a Fed-mail settlement as a response 
by procurement officials to threats by a prospective bidder to impose a protest-driven 
delay of an acquisition—primarily based on technicalities that violate the letter of the 
law. A Buy-off settlement is similar except that it is initiated by the procurement 
official to avoid the penalty of a protest-driven delay due to an (intentional or 
unintentional) error or omission in the procurement process likely to violate the spirit 
of the law.38 
                                            
35 A “survey by the American Bar Association (1989) found that half of all federal agencies had settled 
protests to “simply move forward with the procurement. … POs [procurement officials] often settle by 
enhancing the terms of other contracts that the protester currently has with the procuring agency” 
(Marshall et al., 1994, p. 300).  
36 Procurement officials can subvert the protest system by paying protestors through Fed-mail or Buy-
offs to abandon challenges to procurement decisions. These could include subcontracts, future 
contracts, split buys, cash settlements, etc. 
37 In ADP Bid Protests: Better Disclosure and Accountability of Settlements Needed (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 1990, p. 31), the GAO indicated that it would question the propriety of 
Fed-mail payments, if and when it came across them. 
38 Such cash or in-kind settlements produce a negative externality for taxpayers that can defeat the 
positive private–attorney-general role of protesters. “If the agency problem is severe, the threat of 
protest … induces the [procurement official] (or Awardee) to offer a cash or in-kind settlement to 
protesters. We refer to [this] as ‘buy-off’ settlements” (Marshall et al., 1991, p. 9). Traditionally, Fed-
mail referred to cash settlements in bid protest cases—a practice Congress sought to discourage by 
requiring public reporting of delay-avoiding cash settlements for protests of information technology 
when the GSA Board of Contract Appeals had jurisdiction over such protests.  This problem was 
evaluated by the GAO in its March 1990 report, ADP Bid Protests: Better Disclosure and 
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Ironically, the many ways in which the procurement process can be 
corrupted—which bid protest systems are meant to deter and correct—can reappear 
in well-intentioned, but misguided, Fed-mail and Buy-off settlements by agencies 
trying to keep an acquisition on track. 
At the contract formation phase … evaluation criteria in the request for 
proposal or tender documents could be drafted to favor a particular supplier 
or service provider or … to emphasize weaknesses of a particular competitor. 
Later … the evaluation criteria could be misapplied or otherwise further 
defined or amended after proposal or tender receipt. ... [A]dvance information 
could be provided to a particular favored supplier. Other techniques [might 
include] failing to solicit proposals or tenders from the competitors of a 
favored supplier, wrongfully restricting the tender pool, soliciting offerors 
known to be inferior to a favored supplier, … or rejecting legitimate proposals. 
(Troff, 2005, p. 119, footnote 22)  
                                                                                                                                       
Report 103-258 on the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, adopted by the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee on August 30, 1994:  
In 1990, GAO addressed the settlement process at the Board. This review was in response 
to reports that disappointed offerors were filing protests of contract awards, and to avoid 
procurement delays, agencies would pay protesters to drop their claims. It also followed 
GAO's study of the Census Bureau's handling of a protests of a multimillion dollars 
procurement of ADP for then-upcoming census in which $1.1 million was paid by the agency 
to settle the claims without a review of the merits. 
GAO found that nearly half the protests it sampled were settled before a decision was issued 
by the Board. Slightly more than half of that number involved cases where the terms of the 
settlement were disclosed. Although GAO's sample of cases did not show a high incidence of 
money changing hands, GAO noted that such settlements should be an issue of concern. 
Indeed, GAO concluded: [I]f an agency offers monetary settlements solely to avoid 
operational delays resulting from CICA's suspension procedures, we believe there is no basis 
for the settlement. Further, we would question the appropriateness of monetary settlements 
where the agency (1) thought the protest had no merit or (2) chose not to correct 
procurement flaws that could be corrected, but settled with money because it would take less 
time. *** Because not all settlements are disclosed, the fact that our review did not show a 
high incidence of Fedmail is not conclusive evidence that there is no problem. ***  GAO 
recommended that Congress act legislatively to require that settlement terms be disclosed to 
the Board, and section 1436 would address the issue.  
FASA Section 1436, however, effectively disappeared with the demise of the bid protest jurisdiction of 
the General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA).  No equivalent 
transparency requirement exists today in agency, GAO, or COFC protests.  Congress should 
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There is a serious risk that procurement officials might succumb to strategic 
threats of an automatic stay initiated by prospective bidders/offerors attempting to 
improve their bargaining position.  
Companies may ‘game’ the process, using the stay to exact concessions from 
agencies and to disrupt the … business opportunities of rivals who bested 
them in competition. For example, an incumbent contractor that loses the 
competition … may file a protest simply to stay performance of the new 
contract and extend its current contract for the duration of the GAO protest.  
As long as the marginal profit earned by extending the legacy contract 
exceeds the cost of the protest … the temptation to engage in strategic 
behavior is always present. Alternatively, a failed bidder may stay the award 
through a GAO protest and then seek settlement with the awardee [or 
agency] by getting a portion of the contract as a subcontractor. (Metzger & 
Lyons, 2007, p. 1240)   
As emphasized by Marshall, Meurer, and Richard (1991), protest forums 
“should not grant standing to firms whose sole potential purpose is to use the costs 
and delays inherent in the … [protest] process for [private] gain”39 (p. 19).  
The cost of preventing or deterring inappropriate settlements is an additional 
transaction cost not clearly understood or appreciated in the current operation of the 
protest process. A recommendation of this study is that agencies and departments 
evaluate the risk that protest systems might inadvertently motivate inappropriate 
settlements in order to protect procurement actions.40  
                                            
39 Exploring the additional possibility of settlements occurring between firms, Marshall et al. (1994) 
conclude, “An inter-firm settlement … is essentially equivalent … to a bid-rigging agreement. … [A] 
payment by one firm to another in exchange for a decision not to participate in a procurement would 
certainly be subject to antitrust action” (p. 308). They go on to argue, “Inter-firm settlements of 
protests should be banned. Such settlements produce outcomes that are identical to those that would 
occur with explicit collusion” (p. 314). In contrast, one can imagine cases between an agency and a 
contractor in which the social benefits of a well-crafted (and legal) settlement (to avoid litigation 
expenses, delays, extra transaction and opportunity costs, etc.) could exceed the social costs. 
Regardless, this study recommends any significant settlements be subject to review. 
40 Another recommendation is to extend section 1436 of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 
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Especially troublesome in this context is a protest measure developed and 
routinely reported by the GAO called the effectiveness rate (for example, see 
Kepplinger, 2008). This measure captures “the percentage of protesters obtaining 
relief—either through a protest being sustained, or through voluntary 
action[emphasis added] taken by the agency” (Kepplinger, 2008). Unfortunately, in 
the latter case, so-called “voluntary” actions could easily consist of unproductive 
Fed-mail or Buy-off settlements.41 If so, this would not only undermine but also 
directly contradict a recent conclusion drawn by the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) that “the effectiveness rate may be a good way to measure the 
number of protests that have actual or potential merit” (Schwartz & Manuel, 2009, p. 
5).  
The risk of Fed-mail and Buy-off settlements warrants a serious rethinking by 
the GAO of its protest effectiveness rate measure. It also cautions departments, 
agencies, and Congress against implementing any analysis or recommendations 
that utilize this measure. 
Another serious risk is that agencies may tacitly condone bid protests for 
various improper reasons, such as to obtain direction or a “seal of approval” from the 
GAO. Trends such as increases in corrective actions, highlighted by the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), 42 and underutilization of legal tools 
                                            
41 Any increase in the effectiveness rate could indicate that government agencies are over-generously 
engaged in Fed-Mail or Buy-off settlements to keep procurements on schedule and minimize delays, 
or that they are giving voluntary aid to protestors to avoid negative publicity.   
42 When agencies over-protect or under-defend bid protests, each practice undermines the CRS 
observation: “many analysts consider the increasing willingness of agencies to voluntarily take 
corrective action as one of the most significant trends in bid protests. Such voluntary action by an 
agency could indicate that the agency believes that a given protest has merit” [emphasis added] 
(Schwartz & Manuel, 2009, p. 5). This increase may suggest that agencies are increasingly making 
wrong procurement decisions which the protests are forced to correct.  However, clearly, if increases 
in “voluntary actions” include Fed-mail and Buy-off settlements, this hardly guarantees that those 
protests have merit. On the other hand, as described by Spriggs and Kidalov, agencies may be 
engaging in risky protest litigation and incurring unnecessary legal expenses for the purpose of 
protecting agency reputations and anti-competitive practices.  As a result, agencies are litigating 
protests until the last possible moment before the GAO issues a formal decision even where “a 
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designed to reduce disruptions in the procurement process as highlighted in the 
companion report to this study (Benishek, Sheinman, Kidalov, & Angelis, 2011), 
suggest that the buying agencies may be relying on the GAO bid protest process as 
a substitute for more careful acquisition planning and source selection.   
2. It Pays to Give Procurement Officials the Benefit of the Doubt 
As mentioned earlier, the GAO (and most procuring agencies) grants an 
automatic stay upon the timely filing of a protest. In a very real sense, this automatic 
shutdown of a government procurement action is equivalent to assuming that 
procurement officials are guilty until proven innocent.43 The data suggests that a 
powerful argument can be made for giving procurement officials the benefit of the 
doubt, or for assuming that they are innocent until proven guilty.   
Figure 1 displays data on protest outcomes for the USAF collected from the 
GAO’s Bid Protest Docket, as reported on October 3, 2008. Perhaps the most 
striking feature is that well over two thirds of protests in this sample were found to be 
without merit or were not sustained. Given the goal of promptly and efficiently 
completing an acquisition, this data strongly argues against forcing agencies to incur 
potentially costly delays as a result of the suspension of a procurement (due to an 
automatic stay) while a protest is resolved. 
                                                                                                                                       
legal position” and where agencies are forced to incur document production expenses and pay the 
protester’s legal fees (Spriggs & Kidalov, 2003). 
 
43 An important exception is the Court of Federal Claims (COFC): “In contrast to the automatic stay at 
the GAO, if a protester files its protest at the COFC, it must meet the standards for a preliminary 
injunction to obtain a stay. Thus, the protester must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed in its 
protest, it will suffer irreparable harm unless an injunction is granted, the agency will not suffer a 
greater harm if the injunction is granted, and the public interest favors an injunction” (Schaengold et 
al., 2009, p. 20). Although forcing disappointed bidders to seek a preliminary injunction to stop a 
procurement is more costly (and risky) to the protester, it is recommended, based on the extremely 
low rate of successful protests (and the substantially higher rate of protests that are dismissed, 
denied, etc.), that instead of an automatic stay, agencies and the GAO adopt the COFC standard that 
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Undoubtedly the automatic-stay procedure benefits some contractors by 
preserving the opportunity for resolution of a meritorious protest. But it is far from 
clear … [whether] these benefits outweigh the delays, disruption, and increased 
costs [imposed] upon legitimate contract awards, particularly in light of the fact GAO 
denies two thirds of filed protests. (Metzger & Lyons, 2007, p. 1240) 
 
Figure 1. Rate of Unsuccessful Protests—Almost 70% Dismissed or Denied 
 
The data suggests that it may be appropriate (a) to overturn the implicit 
assumption that procurement officials (PO) are guilty until proven innocent that 
currently underpins the GAO’s automatic stay of disputed procurements, and (b) to 
replace it with the assumption (similar to that of the Court of Federal Claims) that 
POs are innocent until proven guilty. Under today’s binding GAO rules, and 
restrictive regulations and statutes, this argues for departments and agencies to 
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override) arguments44 such as “urgent and compelling circumstances” or “in the 
interest of the United States” 45 (see FAR, subpart 33.103; FAR, subpart 33.104). 
Although rarely addressed in the literature, this argument is nicely captured in 
the following quotations from Metzger and Lyons (2007, p. 1238): 46 
With CICA’s automatic-stay provision, Congress attempted to provide 
effective review of bid challenges, and in the process to encourage 
competition in contracting. … By staying the contract pending the protest, 
CICA implicitly assumes that the agency is at fault. …  
A losing bidder can enjoin a competitor’s contract award for up to one 
hundred days simply by mailing a statement to the Comptroller General 
[GAO] outlining the basis of its protest. … This assumption of agency fault 
and … [the] delay prompted by a GAO stay is particularly puzzling given the 
GAO typically sustains only one third of protests decided on the merits. This 
means that in approximately two thirds of the decided protests the GAO stay 
delays legitimate procurement awards, forcing government agencies to 
extend less effective legacy contracts, pursue expensive temporary stopgap 
measures, or delay the functions that prompted the procurement. (pp. 1238, 
1239) 
                                            
44 When asked how often their agency engages in defensive/preventive strategies in order to 
minimize negative impacts of bid protests on the acquisition process, over 70% of survey 
respondents indicated that they never or only in exceptional cases seek overrides of mandatory stays 
(Benishek et al., 2011, pp. 67-68). 
45 Alternatively, “By adopting a more rigorous threshold review of … filed protest[s], the GAO [could] 
limit … procurement actions … subject to a stay. A rapid dismissal of ‘nuisance’ protests [would 
avoid] the disruptive and costly effects of an unwarranted stay. … [Although in the end,] the 
Comptroller General [where it finds an agency’s decision unreasonable] often proceeds directly to 
invalidate an award, or require re-competition. ... The more nuanced COFC approach recognizes that 
the public interest is not always served by delaying a procurement to correct minor defects in a 
solicitation or errors in the conduct of a competition” (Metzger & Lyons, 2007, p.1268).  Indeed, the 
GAO Bid Protest Regulations presently lack even the standard for determining whether a protest is 
legally frivolous or meritless. 
 
46A more balanced system exists in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (COFC), as described in the 
companion report, Better Acquisition Management. At the COFC, a stay of procurement is 
discretionary and is not granted if the government can establish that “(1) the protester is not likely to 
succeed on the merits of the allegations that the agency action was illegal, arbitrary, capricious, or 
abuse of discretion; (2) the protester will not suffer irreparable injury without injunctive relief; (3) the 
balance of hardships favors the government; and (4) an injunction would be contrary to the public 
interest, including considerations of national defense or national security” (Benishek et al., 2011, p. 
32).  Further, under COFC Rules 65 and 65.1, a protester must post a bond or other security 
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3. Defensive Medicine: The Risk of Over-Deterrence  
Besides the strategic use of protests by firms to extract a competitive 
advantage, another significant cost associated with the current protest system is that 
acquisition officials risk getting caught practicing “defensive medicine.” Such over-
deterrence is manifested in a proliferation of costly (overlapping) reviews instituted to 
ensure that the design and conduct of procurement actions are protest proof. This 
can also be observed in the behavior of procurement officials as they feel 
increasingly paralyzed47 and avoid any actions that might risk triggering a protest.48   
A danger is that acquisition officials will become more concerned with input-
focused compliance rather than output-focused execution, increasing transaction 
costs at the expense of procurement outcomes. Arrowsmith et. al. (2000) warns, 
when the procurement system is primarily rule-based, the focus in assessing 
the performance of procurement officers tends to be on compliance with the 
rules rather than with the quality of results achieved. … This can lead to a 
situation where even within the area of discretion, procurement officers may 
engage in unduly cautious behavior in order to avoid possible accusations of 
non-compliance. …  
[I]ndirect adverse consequences will arise as a result of a fear of [protests] 
by disappointed contractors. This might have the effect of inducing undue 
deference to the interests of contractors to the detriment of the public interest. 
For example, public authorities may become ready to order a re-solicitation at 
                                            
47 “Each agency should preclude management layering and placing nonessential reporting 
procedures and paperwork requirements on program managers and contractors” (Office of 
Management and Budget [OMB], 1976, section 8). 
48 This is related to a risk recently expressed about the latest Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act 
(WSARA) of 2009: 
complaints … often heard … [are] that the WASRA duplicates existing regulations, adds fresh 
layers of bureaucracy and piles of new reporting mandates that could have paralyzing effects 
on a system that already is sluggish and unresponsive. … A combination of confusion and 
fear of making mistakes is fueling paranoia and creating an environment where programs will 
see costs rise and schedules delayed. … The frustration Congress feels translates into more 
reports, and more oversight. (Erwin, 2010) 
An anonymous official recently commented, “Every agency has over 200 years of governance that 
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the slightest complaint, despite the delay … rather than risk legal action with 
its potential for even greater disruption. (pp. 76, 759) 
There is a delicate balance between the desire to eliminate any hint of protest 
liability in order to ensure absolute compliance to avoid protests, and the risk of 
growing transaction and opportunity costs faced by the department to move an 
acquisition forward.49  In such circumstances, agencies should have no reluctance to 
defend their decisions or to use ADR and other expedited resolution tools wherever 
appropriate.   
Another serious and related concern is the risk that a procurement official 
(PO) might deny one company an award in order to avoid incurring protest costs 
from its more litigious opponents. Structuring this as a two-player prisoner’s dilemma 
game suggests that any hint of favoritism on the part of a PO would likely increase 
every bidder’s propensity to protest.  
The logic is straightforward. If one firm is more inclined to protest and the 
other is not, then the protesting firm increases its probability of winning at the 
expense of the other firm. Since the game is symmetric, both firms will eventually be 
more inclined to protest or risk being shut out of future competitions.  
The result is similar to an arms race competition in the sense that, everyone 
is more likely to protest and yet no one is any more secure in obtaining a contract. 
This might help explain a recent observation by current Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics Ashton Carter: “I am and the entire 
department is concerned about protests becoming common or routine” (as cited in 
                                            
49 The risk is that the protest system “tail” begins to wag the procurement process “dog to the 
detriment of procurement outcomes. This risk is amplified if officials are held accountable for current 
delays from protests, but benefit only indirectly from successful future outcomes—i.e. final fielding of 
future programs or capabilities. The latter issue relates to the principal-agent problem discussed later, 
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Shalal-Esa, 2009). A companion explanation emerges when placed in the shoes of a 
disappointed bidder, and asked to look forward and reason back.  
4. Placing Ourselves in the Shoes of a Disappointed Bidder 
In order to understand a firm’s protest strategy, the economics approach 
suggests looking forward and reasoning back. This involves three steps that result in 
two key recommendations.  
(1) The first step is to place ourselves in the shoes of a disappointed 
bidder and ask, what are their goals and objectives? The answer is 
likely profit maximization (i.e., a return to shareholders), including the 
immediate contract and any follow-on business. Much like playing the 
lottery, a disappointed bidder who maximizes profits will calculate the 
expected value of winning the protest. The expected benefit is the 
probability of winning the protest (i.e., the likelihood a protest is 
sustained) multiplied by the payoff (i.e., the reward). A simplified 
version of a disappointed bidder’s decision problem is illustrated in 
Figure 2. To determine whether to file a protest, the disappointed 
bidder looks forward and reasons back. The expected benefit of filing a 
protest is roughly the probability that the GAO will sustain the protest 
(PS) multiplied by the payoff.  
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(2) The second step is to place ourselves in the shoes of a disappointed 
bidder and ask, what constrains their behavior? Unlike playing the 
lottery for fun, economists assume that CEOs are rational “players” 
constrained by shareholders/owners and are likely to engage in a 
benefit-cost-type analysis to determine whether to play (i.e., to file a 
protest). In making its protest decision, a company will weigh the 
discounted present value (or option value) of the expected benefits of 
playing a protest lottery against the costs. The higher the cost of 
playing, the less likely a firm is to file a protest. In this case, “buying a 
ticket” to play (i.e., filing a protest) can include filing fees, hiring lawyers 
and subject-matter experts, paying penalties, and the significant 
opportunity costs of diverting the company’s focus and resources. The 
expected costs of filing a protest are roughly the probability that the 
GAO will deny the protest (1-PS) multiplied by any penalties (including 
opportunity costs).50 
(3) The third and final step is to place ourselves in the shoes of officials 
representing the procurement activity. This involves asking how we 
can align the interests of a contractor with the defense activity’s 
interests to reduce protests. The first opportunity is to lower the 
expected benefits of a protest (i.e., lower the probability of success 
and/or the payoff). The second opportunity is to increase the expected 
costs. 
The economics approach automatically generates two recommendations to 
reduce protests: lower the expected benefits of a protest or increase the expected 
costs.  
Options to increase the expected costs of a protest, include: (i) filing fees 
could be raised to reflect the government’s (agency and GAO) complete costs to 
administer a protest; (ii) firms could be required to post a bond to compensate for 
delays in the event that the protest is denied; or (iii) penalties might be assessed in 
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the event of protests which are either clearly strategic and not in the public interest, 
or largely frivolous protests.  
To lower expected benefits, the first step is to identify feasible ways to reduce 
the probability of successful protests. For example, fraud and errors could be 
reduced  by (i) increasing training and experience, (ii) ensuring the transparency of 
the assessment criteria, (iii) ensuring the transparency and accountability of the 
evaluation and selection process, and (iii) making companies aware of the low 
probability of awards being overturned  
The second step is to identify feasible ways to reduce the payoff from a 
successful protest. Examples of how this could be done include (i) reducing the 
award (unbundling the contract, etc.), and (ii) keeping records of protests by firms 
and using this information in future competitions (i.e., a reputation for delaying 
projects through frivolous protests), This latter option, however, could be 
unconstitutional, against the First and Fifth Amendments, unless targeted protests 
are truly frivolous as defined by Federal judicial precedents.   
Another interesting insight  generated by the economics approach is that 
there may be no such thing as a frivolous protest; only strategic protests. A rational, 
calculating disappointed bidder will only file a protest if the expected benefits 
outweigh the expected costs. Therefore, in reality, so-called “frivolous” lawsuits likely 
reflect the strategic use of protests by firms. A major challenge for a procuring 
activity is to reap the benefits of protests while limiting the unintended 
disruptions/consequences caused by the protest process.51  
                                            
51 Because the Defense Department is grappling with this challenge, it must avoid retaliation in strict 
compliance with settled constitutional principles of freedom to petition the government for redress of 
grievances and due process under the First and Fifth Amendments.  It is critical to make distinctions 
between legally frivolous protests that can be sanctioned under law and protests that are 
unmeritorious, marginally meritorious, or insufficiently meritorious for injunctive relief.  The GAO 
considers a protest to be “clearly meritorious” when “a reasonable agency inquiry into the protester’s 
allegations would show facts disclosing the absence of a defensible legal position” GAO, The Real 
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B. The Optimum Rate of Protests 
The effort to balance the benefits of protests against the potentially significant 
(opportunity and transaction) costs suggests that there is an optimum rate of 
protests. Although it is unrealistic to think that we can precisely pin down this 
optimum, it is useful to discuss its characteristics.  
For example, suppose the Department of Defense finds itself above the 
optimum. In this case, reducing the rate of protests is warranted because benefits to 
all parties (buyers, sellers, and taxpayers) outweigh the costs. However, if the 
Defense Department happens to be at or below the optimum rate, then any direct 
(short-run) benefits from reducing protests could be more than offset by indirect 
                                                                                                                                       
(2011, pp. 111–112) report, the GAO presently does not make a determination of whether a protest is 
legally frivolous, but the COFC does: 
Under Rule 11 of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims, a protester can be sanctioned 
only if the protest: (1) is being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and 
other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for 
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual 
contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary 
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the 
denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, 
are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.  
Under Rule 11, 
a sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the 
conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. The sanction may include 
nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and 
warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of 
the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation. (Rules 
of the Court of Federal Claims, Rule 11 as amended through Jan. 11, 2010). CITATION) 
The COFC does not sanction protests that do not meet these requirements.  As noted in the 
Better Acquisition Management report “Necessarily, a protestor would have some right to due 
process in order to “avoid punishing a company for filing a good-faith but unmeritorious protest.” 
(GAO, B-401197, 2009, 13).  This process may actually make the overall protest process longer, 
which could have potential negative impacts on the acquisition system.  However, bringing the GAO 
Bid Protest Regulations to parity with COFC concerning sanctions for truly frivolous protests could 
provide a deterrent and, more importantly, address the perception that GAO may be welcoming 
frivolous protests.”  However, the COFC Rules 65 and 65.1 require protesters in unmeritorious 
protests to forfeit bonds for wrongfully restraining the government.  Further, under title 28, section 
1491(b)(3), the COFC can deny a permanent injunction remedy where the agency’s conduct was 
arbitrary or illegal, but the illegality or arbitrariness is outweighed by national security, national 
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(long-run) costs—e.g., undermining the deterrent against errors, fraud, and 
favoritism. In this case, the net effect of reducing protests could turn out to be 
detrimental to the long-term interests of the Defense Department. It is enlightening to 
explore what is an understandable aim of the Defense Department: to reduce the 
rate of successful protests. 
1. Exploring the Objective of Reducing the Rate of Successful 
Protests 
In discussing the DoD’s objective to reduce the rate of successful protests, it 
is important to recognize that the impacts of protests on a procuring activity vary 
greatly. Policies designed to reduce the rate of successful protests can either focus 
on acquisitions that have a relatively trivial impact on the activity or, instead, on 
those that are critical to (or on the critical path of) key activity investments and 
operations. Clearly, scarce leadership time and resources are better spent on the 
latter (critical, major acquisitions) rather than on the former (non-critical, minor 
acquisitions).  
A simple illustration of this important distinction, using data from the USAF, 
appears in Figure 3. Over a recent eight-year period from FY2001–2008, even 
though the rate of successful protests or the “sustain rate” was relatively constant, 
the magnitude of those protests, or the “impact rate” (measured here in terms of the 
share of competitive procurement dollars involved), increased dramatically.  
If senior leaders were to strictly focus on reducing the sustain rate (or the rate 
of successful protests), then since the USAF only faced 3 successful protests in 
2001 out of the 98 protests of procurements closed that year, it faced a sustain rate 
of nearly 3%. From this perspective, the protest problem appears to be stable or 
even declining; there were only 2 successful protests out of 112 closed in 2008, a 
sustain rate just under 2% (see Figure 3). Unfortunately, simply focusing on the rate 
of successful protests (the sustain rate) is misleading. It hides the true impact of 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 31 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
It turns out that in 2001, successful protests against the USAF involved 
roughly $260 million worth of procurements, or an impact rate of around 1% of total 
competitive procurement dollars that year. Compare this to a contract amount of 
over $36 billion tied up in the two successful protests in 2008, or an impact rate of 
nearly 97% of USAF competitive procurement dollars (see Figure 3). It is clear that 
simply focusing on reducing the rate of successful protests (the sustain rate) risks 
missing the larger impact those protests have on USAF investments and operations.  
 
Figure 3. Rate of Successful Protests—Sustain Rate versus Impact Rate 
(Data is from USAF Annual Bid Protest Update [January 1, 2009]: Synopsis of Bid 
Protests [GAO] for FY2001-2008) 
In shaping protest policy, senior leadership should focus its attention on 
critical procurements—i.e., those acquisitions likely to have the greatest impacts on 
investments and operations if they are protested—possibly, but not necessarily, high 
cost Major Defense Acquisition Programs. It could be useful for each Service to 
develop a measure similar to the “impact rate” illustrated in Figure 3. To help shape 
its protest policies, this study recommends  that the Defense Department focus on 
identifying key factors and characteristics associated or correlated with successful 
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2. How Reducing Protests Can Actually Increase Competition 
The assumption captured in the opening quotation of the Introduction—an 
assumption that appears throughout the legal and regulatory literature—is that 
protests act as a deterrent to bad behavior on the part of procurement officials. The 
general conclusion in the literature is that increasing the ability to protest is likely to 
increase competition. However, from an economics perspective, this implicitly 
assumes we are below the optimum level of protests—or that the social benefits of 
increasing protests outweigh the social costs.  
The Defense Department is concerned with the opposite—reducing the rate 
of protests. But this implicitly assumes that we are above the optimum level of 
protests, or that the benefits of reducing protests outweigh the costs. Fortunately, 
there are two ways to reduce protests that could actually increase competition, 
regardless of where the Defense Department happens to be relative to the optimum, 
and conceivably improve procurement outcomes.  
Rather than simply adopting a popular objective such as minimizing the 
number of protests (see Schwartz & Manuel, 2009, p. 1), a more nuanced 
economics view of the protest problem is based on three fundamental assumptions: 
(i) incentives matter, (ii) prices matter, and (iii) demand curves slope down. Given 
these assumptions, and placing ourselves in the shoes of a representative 
prospective bidder, we obtain a powerful, new, and somewhat counterintuitive 
insight: Regardless of where the Defense Department happens to be relative to the 
optimum, there exist policies to reduce protests that can actually increase 
competition. 
The two main explanations for this include one that is obvious and one that is 
less obvious. The first involves the possibility of reducing protests by decreasing the 
expected benefits to a disappointed bidder of challenging a procurement action. The 
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(4) Decreasing the expected benefits of a challenge: The first, somewhat 
obvious, explanation of how reducing protests can increase 
competition focuses on reducing protests by reducing agency errors, 
fraud, and favoritism—for example, by substituting protests with 
alternatives such as random audits and investigations or by investing 
in training, linking pay and promotion to successful procurement 
outcomes, and hiring more experienced acquisition personnel.52 This 
approach reduces protests but simultaneously tends to build 
confidence in the integrity of the solicitation and selection process, 
boosting the expected benefits of participation, and, therefore, is likely 
to increase competition. 
(5) Increasing the expected costs of a challenge: There is another less 
obvious explanation where reducing protests can increase competition. 
Even where protests are reduced by raising the expected costs of a 
challenge—for example, by increasing filing fees, restricting the filing 
window, abolishing mandatory stay, narrowing standing (i.e., eligibility), 
raising the threshold for a protest to have merit,53 or establishing 
penalties such as fines or exclusions from bidding or filing future 
protests for truly frivolous/nuisance protests and/or “loser pays” for 
protests that have some merit but are not sustained—this could still 
increase competition. In this case, the explanation is less 
straightforward, but only because it is largely overlooked in the current 
legal and regulatory literature.  
                                            
52 The Joint Analysis Team (JAT), organized by the Under Secretary of Defense, has collected data 
that indicates acquisition workloads recently increased while the level of experienced personnel 
decreased. The data reveals that the DoD has seen a significant drop in its trained, mid-level 
acquisition personnel. Over the period FY1998–FY2008, those with 10 to 19 years of experience 
declined from 47% of the workforce to 17% (JAT, 2009). 
53 Raising the threshold for merit involves Type I and II errors from statistical hypothesis testing. 
Suppose the null hypothesis is that the agency (PO) is innocent. Increasing the burden of proof that 
an agency is guilty decreases the Type I error (reject null when null is true), but increases Type II 
errors (accept null/innocent when null is false, i.e., guilty). However, the cost to an agency or 
department is substantial given the automatic stay assumption of guilty until proven innocent and 
stands in sharp contrast to the demanding standards required for a preliminary injunction (innocent 
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The primary focus of the extant literature is on so-called prospective “losing” 
bidders. Clearly, bidders that fear losing a competition are more inclined to 
participate the greater the probability they might get a second bite at the apple (i.e., 
the greater the opportunity to protest a negative outcome). So while the procuring 
activity could lower its expected costs of a protest by promoting policies that 
increase a bidder’s expected costs of engaging in a protest, since this increases 
risks faced by “losing” bidders, if they refuse to participate in the bidding it could 
harm competition. The conclusion drawn in the legal and regulatory literature is that 
reducing the ability to protest is likely to reduce competition.  
However, the literature is nearly silent when it comes to another important 
type of bidder: the so-called prospective “winning” bidders. The greater the risk (and 
expected costs) of protests, the less inclined prospective winning bidders will be to 
participate in a competition.54 In focusing on losing bidder types, the literature 
ignores the role played by winning bidder types. From a winning bidder’s 
perspective, a protest delays the project and generates significant (opportunity) 
costs to defend an award—similar in nature to delays and costs incurred by the 
procuring activity.55 In this case, policies that restrict protests could actually increase 
competition, since limiting protests generates a greater expected prize that (on the 
margin) should attract more prospective winning bidder types.  
In summary, by selecting policies that reduce the protest risks of procurement 
activities, the DoD might increase the risks faced by losing bidder types, hurting 
competition, but it could also reduce the risks faced by winning bidder types, 
                                            
54 In other words, they will charge (bid) a higher price to compensate for this extra risk to participate in 
a competition. Publicly traded government contractor firms are obligated to account for bid protest 
risks to their investors as part of so-called “forward-looking statements” and disclaimers under the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995 (1995). Conversely, a disappointed bidder 
may introduce the element of risk for winning bidders by publicly announcing that it intends to protest 
and tagging the threat of protest as a PSLRA statement. The threat of protests (even if unsuccessful) 
can act as barriers to entry. The prospect of a protest by a losing bidder imposes costs that reduce 
the expected value of entering the competition (see the representative bidder model in Section III). 
55 As pointed out in the literature, “In post-award protests, awardees will often intervene on the side of 
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boosting competition. The net effect is an empirical question with enormous policy 
implications. A recommendation of this study is for procurement officials to sponser 
an empirical analysis to investigate this issue (including an estimate of any bid 
protest premiums incurred by contractors on capital markets and passed on to the 
government). 
It could turn out that the net effect on competition depends on where an 
activity finds itself in terms of the optimum rate of protests. For instance, if in some 
range limiting protests by raising the expected costs of a challenge actually 
increases competition, then this could mitigate any perceived negative effects that 
reducing protests has on the integrity, transparency, and accountability of the 
procurement process.  
Ideally, policy initiatives that limit protests could be combined with a portfolio 
of other carefully selected, cost-effective governance mechanisms (internal audits, 
external audits, independent investigations, training investments, etc.), reducing the 
need for the monitoring and oversight role of protests. In terms of limiting protests, 
an extreme example is found in the private sector. Protest systems are virtually 
unheard of in the broader economy. 
C. Public versus Private Procurement Governance 
Mechanisms: A Counter-Factual 
In sharp contrast to government protest systems, the private sector rarely 
allows bid protests. Instead, private firms govern their transactions using a different 
set of oversight mechanisms. They rely more on reputation, internal audits, exacting 
definitions of buyer requirements (see generally, Johnson, 2003), external 
(shareholder) audits and on aligning the incentives of procurement personnel with 
those of the company through performance-based bonuses and promotions.  
Under private contract law, disappointed offerors generally have no right to 
attack the buyer’s choice of suppliers. Private contract law usually provides 
no basis for recovery where the offeror contends that the buyer: (1) defined 
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of the offeror’s goods, (2) refused to consider the bids of specific offerors, (3) 
failed to adhere to announced selection criteria, or (4) applied its selection 
criteria unevenly. (Kovacic, 1995, p. 466)  
The profit motive helps align the interests of contracting personnel to solicit 
and select contractual partners that maximize value to the firm. The powerful 
oversight role of market forces automatically rewards companies that select vendors 
who offer the best value-added combination of performance, costs, and schedules. 
Companies with poor contractual outcomes are punished with losses by market 
forces. They are eventually broken up or go bankrupt. In fact, a firm’s contracting 
reputation is key to its successful interactions with other companies.   
The private contract system relies mainly on reputation to constrain the 
discretion of private purchasers. … A private buyer cannot afford to treat 
suppliers of inputs too arbitrarily or unfairly, lest sellers refuse to deal with the 
buyer in the future. (Kovacic, 1995, p. 466)    
In addition, unfairly treated suppliers may have remedies under the Federal or 
state antitrust laws (see, for example, Federal Trade Commission, 2010).   Courts 
have carefully limited these remedies to avoid granting advantage to individual 
competitors at the expense of the public interest in competition.  For example, 
remedies for attempted monopolizing of trade in violation of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act (2010). “should not attempt to redress harm to competition by 
‘providing aid to any particular competitor,’ but rather should aim ‘to restore 
conditions in which the competitive process is revived and any number of 
competitors may flourish (or not) based upon the merits of their offerings’” 
(Department of Justice, 2008).  As a result, antitrust remedies for disappointed 
bidders in private sector transactions are significantly weaker than bid protest 
remedies for transactions with the public sector. 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) suggests that cooperative behavior often 
arises in situations of repeated private interaction in which each side has a sufficient 
enough stake in the future to outweigh any short-term gains from acting 
opportunistically (Melese et al., 2007). Either a relationship must be repeated 
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performance can be easily monitored by future trading partners, reputation can 
govern behavior. However, the noisier (more complex/uncertain) the product, 
service, or the environment, the less effectively this works. As complexity increases 
and frequency falls, relational contracting tends to evolve from a bilateral relationship 
to a trilateral relationship. 56   
In this case, a third party (independent auditor, alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) agreement, etc.) often provides guarantees to facilitate and improve 
contractual outcomes. The third party can help monitor transactions or offer 
arbitration when disputes arise.  
Bid protest systems are a type of third-party monitoring mechanism. However, 
it is sobering to consider what the ramifications would be if the current federal 
protest process was forced upon the private sector. It would likely shut down entire 
industries.  
                                            
56 An important insight of the Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) literature (see Melese et al., 2007; 
Williamson, 1971,  1979,  1999) is that ex-ante competition can lead to ex-post monopoly power. 
According to basic TCE principles, there is always a risk that firms in a transaction will act 
opportunistically. The hold-up problem is a classic example. Related to the foot-in-the-door strategy, a 
firm might strategically bid low to win a contract with the aim of raising prices later. After winning the 
contract, if a firm invests in specific assets (specialized human capital or equipment, a location 
advantage, etc.) that make that firm more valuable in terms of the transaction (performance, cost, and 
schedule), but that also act as a barrier to future entry by competitors, then it acquires the ability to 
hold-up the government. Since one of the stated goals of a protest system is to increase competition, 
this is an important consideration. The risk is that valuable investments in assets that are specific to 
the relationship can change the nature of that relationship from one of ex-ante competition to ex-post 
monopoly supplier. In this case, the firm has the ability to threaten to hold-up the government and 
raise prices (say on change orders, etc.) high enough to more than make up for its artificially low 
initial bid. It would be interesting to determine empirically if the hold-up problem merits more attention 
than, say, is currently being paid to bid protests in the public procurement selection process. 
Regardless of who wins, if data suggests that hold-up-type problems routinely contribute to schedules 
and performance slipping and prices/costs increasing, then winning bid proposals are not credible. 
Since losing firms no longer have an option to protest, a recommendation might be to consider 
building a clause into contracts that compensates the losing bidder or interested party (i.e., the first 
runner-up) in the event that the winning bidder cannot perform what they promised in order to win the 
competition. The goal is to hold companies accountable for following through with proposals offered 
to win a contract. The outcome could be more truthful bids/proposals and better outcomes for our 
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Evidence that imposing the public protest process on the private sector would 
be prohibitively costly is strongly reinforced by the following example. This example 
involves a relationship between three private defense contractors and their 
suppliers/subcontractors.  
To place the potentially crushing costs of a private bid protest process in 
perspective, consider the findings of a 1992 Commerce Department study that 
examined the supply chain for three representative U.S. Naval weapon systems: the 
HARM missile, the Mark-48 ADCAP torpedo, and the Verdin communication system. 
It turns out that a total of “11,638 companies … [served] as active suppliers to the 
prime contractors for the three weapon systems,” 6,818 for the HARM missile, 1,483 
for the Verdin, and 3,336 for the Mark-48 torpedo (Department of Commerce, 
1992).57 
Forced to abide by the government’s bid protest process in dealing with their 
multiple suppliers and subcontractors, these companies would have incurred 
prohibitively high transaction costs. The protest process would have imposed 
significant delays, cost-overruns, and performance gaps that would have forced 
much of the work in-house or shut down operations entirely. The likely result: lower 
performance, higher costs, and significant delays in the three weapons systems. 
This sobering example should place the considerable burden of a bid protest 
process in perspective.  
                                            
57 These are not unusual cases in the defense sector. There are strong (“rent-seeking”) incentives to 
proliferate suppliers across political jurisdictions in order to increase the probability of favorable 
treatment in congressional appropriations. For example, the Air Force B-1 program had 
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So why does the protest process dominate public procurement law58 and give 
disappointed bidders/offerors such expansive rights to challenge an acquisition? The 
answer lies in the economist’s principal-agent problem.59 
D. The Principal-Agent Problem 
The delegation of procurement authority raises a principal-agent problem. In 
the simplest terms, the government (the principal), who represents troops and 
taxpayers, asks procurement officials (agents) to conduct procurement actions on its 
behalf. The principal-agent problem arises if there are conflicting objectives (i.e., if 
agents do not have the same objectives as the principal) and if key aspects of the 
agent’s behavior are not easily monitored (also known as the agency problem).60  
A serious issue in the public sector is that the reward system does not encourage a 
high level of effort (training investment or experience) and does not necessarily align 
the interests of the agent with the principal. The risk is that the principal’s (taxpayers 
and troops) objectives of better, faster, cheaper may not be fully adopted by agents 
(procurement officials) responsible for carrying out those decisions: . “Government 
                                            
58 Two arguments occasionally heard that help explain the willingness to incur the burden of bid 
protests to govern public procurement are: (1) that government has enormous power to influence the 
economy and the fortunes of individual firms through its purchasing decisions, and (2) that because 
the expenditure of public funds is at issue, and the government should take extraordinary precautions 
to ensure taxpayer interests are protected.  
59 Selected examples of the literature include Grossman and Hart (1983), Sappington (1991), 
Holmstom and Milgrom (1991), and Prendergast (1999).  
60 A classic solution to a principal-agent problem is found in the popular saying “If you want something 
done right, then do it yourself.” Principal-agent problems can arise in a number of different ways. One 
example of Conflicting Objectives is a situation in which a procurement official (PO) might bias an 
award to a favored bidder to minimize their own transaction costs (i.e., administrative costs), even 
though that bidder offers higher production (direct) costs. For example, it is often easier for a PO to 
select a product or an incumbent firm with which they are more familiar. (“No one was ever fired for 
buying from IBM”). A second example of Conflicting Objectives is a situation in which there are issues 
related to asymmetric information. POs may not be as well informed about the product they are 
buying if government personnel have less experience than their private-sector counterparts and if 
purchases involve idiosyncratic (complex, uncertain, highly differentiated) goods that are infrequently 
purchased. A key question revolves around incentives for POs (agents) to educate themselves and 
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purchasing agents lack the same incentives as their private sector counterparts to 
make procurement choices that maximize interests of their principals. … Private 
firms … develop monitoring and incentive schemes that [motivate] purchasing 
agents to make efficient contracting choices” (Kovacic, 1995, p. 467).  
The principal-agent problem is not as pronounced when standard 
(homogeneous) products like food products are being procured. In this case, simply 
requiring competitive bidding effectively combats incentive problems.61 The 
procurement official has little discretion and any attempt to award a contract to a firm 
other than the lowest bidder can easily be detected.  
However, the focus of this study is on highly differentiated (heterogeneous), 
complex products (or services) that allow procurement officials to retain substantial 
discretion in formulating and applying scoring methodologies to evaluate and select 
alternatives and to determine the optimal exclusion of firms. This requires highly 
competent procurement officials who are presented with incentives aligned to obtain 
the best possible outcomes for our troops and taxpayers. Unfortunately, institutional 
constraints on pay and benefits limit the power of incentive contracts to align the 
interests of procurement officials closely with those of taxpayers and troops. 62   
Related to this are two other institutional constraints, rapid turnover and the 
revolving door.  Both result in agents (procurement officials) having relatively higher 
discount rates, i.e., emphasizing visible current benefits of a procurement action that 
will benefit their career and deferring less visible costs that might be incurred as a 
result of that procurement action until after they depart. This is especially true if a 
procurement official views his or her current employment as a stepping stone either 
                                            
61 Competitive procurements also help overcome the challenge of asymmetric information (i.e., the 
relative ignorance of buyers) if well-informed sellers compete against one another for the contract. 
 
62 With a highly differentiated, complex, uncertain, heterogeneous product (i.e., MDAP), it is more 
difficult to verify that the awardee necessarily offers the best combination of price and quality, hence 
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to a promotion to another position within the government or to a better job 
opportunity in the private sector.63  
Compounding these incentive problems is the fact that agency errors are 
more likely to occur when the government has difficulty retaining personnel because 
salaries are low compared to the private sector and when personnel are rapidly 
rotated through procurements (with the corresponding challenge of preserving 
accountability). The result is inadequate experience and technical knowledge,64 
which requires that agents depend on vendors to help draft solicitations, creating a 
further wedge between the principals’ and the agents’ objectives. Of course, this 
also creates unfair opportunities for some firms to gain an advantage in an 
acquisition. Third-party oversight of the procurement process is needed if the 
government’s objectives are not equally shared by procurement personnel who 
administer the process, or if legitimate errors arise that can bias source selection. 
Closely related to this is the “appropriability” problem. The appropriability 
problem is an incentive problem that arises when procurement officials (agents) 
cannot appropriate (or are not fully compensated for) the value of any extra effort 
they make in their positions, and it arises when those efforts are not easily measured 
or monitored. For example, including extra bidders in an acquisition can potentially 
reduce costs for the government (principal), but it means extra work for a 
procurement official (agent). An appropriability problem exists if the agent incurs the 
full costs (responsibility) of running a procurement (evaluating extra bids, etc.), but 
receives little of the extra benefits. In this case, for example, a decision to bundle 
                                            
63 Other institutional constraints such as yearly budget appropriations make planning horizons shrink, 
constraining administrative resources and resulting in end-of-year use-it-or-lose-it decisions, which 
are combined with reprogramming constraints that govern the inter-temporal substitution of funds. 
The result can be that short-handed personnel are asked to complete procurement-related tasks in 
relatively brief periods, where the measures of a job well done are the costs incurred in running the 
procurement and the speed with which the final product is delivered. Suboptimization at different 
levels in the organization can inadvertently result in misaligned incentives.  
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several contracts together might actually reduce the agent’s costs (and the costs of 
the transaction), but could also reduce the number of bidders, thereby limiting 
competition, resulting in a less favorable procurement outcome.  
The appropriability problem can also be manifested in reduced incentives to 
test products or in overlooking alternative solutions to satisfy demands, say by 
ignoring new products or vendors. Of course, another explanation for too little effort 
being exerted is that agents (program managers, etc.) are not allocated sufficient 
resources. In this case, lower effort is the result of dedicated program managers 
simply not being allocated the resources to accomplish the high-quality results that 
our troops and taxpayers deserve.65 
A risk acknowledged both in the literature and in practice is that conflicting 
objectives of procurement officials are occasionally reflected in fraud and favoritism 
(corruption), or in inadequate investments in human capital (errors).66 In the case of 
corruption, the risk is that procurement officials might steer an award to a favored 
bidder in exchange for private benefits (favors or bribes) at the expense of higher 
public costs.  Favoritism can be generated in many ways, some pernicious (bid-
rigging, bribes, expectations of future employment, etc.) and some benign 
                                            
65 Alternatively, too little effort might simply be a manifestation of the risk of over-deterrence, 
discussed earlier. Procurement officials risk becoming paralyzed by their attempts to follow the 
mountains of rules and regulations that currently govern the procurement process and that are 
subject to oversight by the protest process. 
66 A related issue is the incentive problem arising from conflicting lines of authority—for example, a 
contracting officer and a program (technical or project) manager. The technical officer is responsible 
for assessing agency needs and writing the technical portion of the solicitation and for assisting in 
negotiations and technical evaluation of proposals. The contracting officer has primary responsibility 
for negotiations, evaluation, award, and administration of a contract. Technical officers are motivated 
to purchase the best technology available, given the budget, while contracting officers want to assure 
regulatory compliance and rapid completion. Technical people tend to support higher technology 
while contracting people push for more competition. The resulting specifications and evaluation 
criteria emerge from a bargain between the two, including issues such as how much weight to give 
cost versus quality (technical factors/attributes) in the scoring function. For example, “In DoD, there is 
a mind-set that, since human lives are at stake in military conflicts, any expense is justified in 
acquiring the latest and best technology” (MMR, 1991, p. 5). We abstract from this potential 
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(friendships, personal preferences, etc.). When appropriability problems prevent 
government procurement officials from receiving adequate rewards for decisions that 
benefit taxpayers, the risk is that “lower pay scales and weaknesses in the incentive 
systems used to motivate public employees [will make] government officials … more 
prone to succumb to … temptations” (Kovacic, 1995, p. 488).   
These “temptations” can be reflected in abuses of discretion by procurement 
officials such as (a) failure to make appropriate quality-price tradeoffs, (b) the 
tendency to skew specifications and source selection decisions to favor incumbent 
suppliers, and (c) underinvestment in activities that maximize taxpayer interests. In 
this case, third-party oversight mechanisms help ensure that procurement officials 
follow rules and regulations and do not unduly restrict competition. Protests can be 
interpreted as a powerful oversight tool that compensates for weaknesses in 
incentives67 generated by conflicting objectives:   “A robust protest system helps cure 
principal-agent problems that arise in the public procurement system … by 
increasing the likelihood that deviations by the agent (the purchasing agency) from 
the guidance of the principal (Congress) will be detected and corrected” (Kovacic, 
1995, p. 486). 
Another rationale occasionally heard to justify third-party monitoring is that 
government purchasing officials are less competent (more prone to making errors) 
than private-sector purchasing agents: “Compared to its industry counterparts, [the 
DoD contracting] workforce is undertrained, underpaid, and inexperienced” (Kovacic, 
1995, p. 487). 
                                            
67 The intent of the Congress expressed in the CICA was for the protest process to encourage private 
enforcement of laws and regulations through full and open competition. There is another principal-
agent problem in enforcing procurement regulations that can be resolved with protests. Rather than 
depend on government agencies (auditors, inspectors, etc.) to monitor compliance in the public 
interest, the protest process aligns the private interests of the bidders/offerors who have a stake in 
the procurement outcome to ensure the proper conduct of the procurement (delegating enforcement 
to disappointed bidders). If the protest machinery provides powerful remedies (stays, the award of 
attorneys fees, re-competition, etc.), then this can supply strong incentives for private contractors to 
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The protest process can also be viewed as compensating for deficiencies in 
the skills of government purchasing personnel by reducing their discretion and 
subjecting their decisions to more oversight68: “Protest controls are one part of a 
large body of regulatory safeguards that are deemed necessary to deter and punish 
ineptitude, sloth, or corruption of public purchasing officials” (Kovacic, 1995, p. 469).  
However, it is not clear that any empirical analysis has conclusively 
demonstrated government purchasing officials make less-sound procurement 
choices than their private-sector counterparts.69  
There is scant empirical evidence for judging whether public purchasing 
officials are more prone to “shirk” in maximizing taxpayer interests than 
private purchasing officials are to shirk in maximizing shareholder interests, or 
what net effect … protest controls have had on procurement outcomes. 
(Kovacic, 1995, p. 491)  
Protests are one means of deterring and correcting principal-agent and 
appropriability (agency) problems in public procurement. Another approach is to 
improve public-sector pay and training for procurement officials—or human capital 
investments. Internal audits, external audits, investigations, sanctions, and penalties 
offer other approaches—all of which are attempts to increase transparency and 
accountability in procurement. 
A primary purpose of oversight is to control the discretion of government 
officials who make contract awards, since their incentives are often poorly 
aligned with the interests of taxpayers. … [O]versight induces procurement 
officials … to make purchase decisions that are more consistent with the 
objectives of the government. (Marshall et al., 1991, p. 2) 
                                            
68 Private-sector purchasing organizations achieve competition by strictly limiting discretion of their 
purchasing officials.  For instance, General Motors information technology purchasing process 
provides for clear definition of scope of work, one-time negotiation, firm-fixed price contracts, and a 
change management process subject to robust discipline. Federal purchasing officials are not 
similarly constrained (see Johnson, 2003). 
69 Literature suggests that private-sector purchasers make better procurement decisions because of 
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A challenge for the DoD is to choose an optimum mix (portfolio) of 
governance mechanisms that will minimize the costs of aligning incentives—to 
reduce the risk of fraud and errors and to encourage competition—and that will 
guarantee the best possible procurement outcomes for our troops and taxpayers.70 
E. Alternative Governance Mechanisms: Human Capital 
Investments and Third-Party Monitoring to Address 
Principal-Agent Problems in Procurement 
The goal of military procurements is to obtain the best (troop) value for 
(taxpayer) money. A recent study suggests this can be accomplished by carefully 
adopting one of six ways to structure an acquisition.71 The first so-called Economic 
Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA) was the approach originally employed by RAND to 
structure the KC-X aerial tanker refueler competition: given a particular user-
determined performance and schedule combination, select the vendor that offers the 
lowest (discounted) total system life-cycle costs.72  “Here, an ‘alternative’ can be a 
fleet consisting of a single type of aircraft. … [I]n this AoA, the most ‘cost-effective’ 
alternative means precisely the alternative whose effectiveness meets the aerial 
refueling requirement at the lowest cost” (Kennedy et al., 2006, p. 7). 
Structuring procurements and evaluating and selecting vendors to obtain the 
greatest cost effectiveness (or value for money) requires a delicate balance between 
rules and discretion.  This is an important issue in the design of any regulatory 
                                            
70 As shown in the companion report, DoD must also ensure that its agency procurement officials 
manage bid protests in ways that are not encumbered by parochial or personal considerations and 
that align with DoD interest in reducing protest-related costs and delays (see Benishek et al., (2011, 
pp. 107–113). 
71 The main contribution of these six techniques is to offer alternative approaches to the contentious 
issue of weighting costs and performance—responsible either directly or indirectly for multiple 
protests (see Melese, 2009). 
72 The second EEoA approach is for procurement officials to estimate a multi-year budget for the 
overall program, and then to select the vendor that offers the best possible performance and 
schedule combination over the relevant time period.  Similar to these first two approaches, the 
remaining four require procurement officials to estimate future budgets for a program, in addition to 
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regime, and it is especially relevant in attempts to re-shape the bid protest process. 
This trade-off between rules and discretion is reflected in the following observation: 
When we design organizations based on rules, we guard against disaster, but 
at the cost of stifling excellence. … Government officials deprived of 
discretion which could produce misbehavior, are at the same time deprived of 
discretion that could call forth outstanding achievement. (Kelman, 1990, p. 
28) 
As discussed earlier in the context of over-deterrence, a heavily rule-based 
approach involves significant transaction costs that can adversely affect the 
efficiency and effectiveness of procurements, but on the other hand, greater 
discretion exacerbates the principal-agent problem. To complement any increased 
role of discretion,73 Arrowsmith et al. (2000) offer a valuable reminder: 
Where the role of discretion is increased in the procurement system, careful 
attention needs to be given to matters such as professional training and 
recruiting high-caliber procurement personnel—which may involve … 
enhancing pay or the career development structure, or recruiting from the 
private sector. (p. 85)  
The appropriate balance between rules and discretion also depends on 
attitudes towards corruption and the skills of procurement personnel. The greater the 
investment in human capital and the better aligned the incentives, the greater the 
opportunity to relax regulatory constraints. 
 According to the United Nations Guide to Enactment of the Model Law on 
Procurement, “an effective means to review acts and decisions of the procuring 
entity and procurement procedures … is essential to ensure the proper functioning 
of the procurement system and to promote confidence in the system” (UNCITRAL, 
1995, p. 99). 
                                            
73 “Much greater freedom should be given in decisions that affect a manager’s ability to accomplish 
his mission. Then the manager should be held responsible for how well he does in accomplishing the 
mission. … [E]nergy that now goes into the development of rules to restrict public officials should be 
redirected toward thinking about how to develop results-based performance evaluation” (Arrowsmith 
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The challenge is to choose the most cost-effective portfolio of initiatives that 
aligns incentives and that provides adequate monitoring and enforcement of 
procurements in order to reduce the risk of fraud and errors and to encourage 
competition. In searching for alternative approaches, the optimum mix will include 
targeted investments in human capital as well as centralized (audits and 
investigations) and decentralized (bid protests) third-party governance mechanisms. 
Valuable human capital investments include initiatives for building integrity 
(e.g., ethics training, clearly stated and widely distributed standards of conduct, etc.),  
acquisition training (e.g., augmenting skills and experience), and pay for 
performance (or other ways to align incentives to improve procurement outcomes).74 
In general, third-party governance mechanisms increase transparency and improve 
accountability.  “Procurement laws which emphasize transparency generally contain 
extensive provisions to [verify] compliance … [and] some mechanism for supervision 
and enforcement, [emphasis added] whether by the administrative hierarchy, the 
public or legislature, or by aggrieved firms through a complaint [bid protest] 
procedure” (Arrowsmith et al., 2000, p. 75). 
Bid protest systems are an example of a decentralized third party governance 
mechanism that relies on private enforcement to increase transparency and 
accountability in procurement.75 
                                            
74 “Many systems, especially those which emphasize … transparency, make provisions for some 
means of external enforcement. … Of course the extent of compliance with the rules will also be 
greatly affected by … factors such as the quality and training of procurement and management 
personnel, levels of pay and incentives, and the general ‘culture’ of the procuring institution [including] 
requirements for review and approval of procurement decisions” (Arrowsmith et al., 2000, p. 749).  
 
75 The bid protest process provides decentralized oversight by making procurement decisions subject 
to challenge by bidders (or offerors). The basic premise underlying the bid protest system is that a 
robust protest mechanism improves procurement performance by generating competition for 
government contracts and by monitoring the performance of government officials who may not 
exercise discretion to the benefit of taxpayers. A recommendation is to collect data to determine 
whether the protest process and process reforms have improved the performance of government 
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In order for a procurement process to achieve value for money, the three 
most frequently cited policy goals are equity, efficiency, and integrity:  
The history of federal procurement law demonstrates a concern for three 
policy goals, namely: equity (in the sense of fair access of bidders to the 
procurement); integrity (i.e., no corruption); and efficiency (meaning the 
selection of [the best vendor]. … [A] court commenting on procurement law 
noted that “the purpose of these statutes … is to give all persons equal right 
to compete for Government Contracts; to prevent unjust favoritism, or 
collusion or fraud [in awarding government contracts];  and thus to secure for 
the Government the benefits which arise from competition.” (as cited in 
Marshall et al., 1991, p. 2)  
Protests offer a type of third-party oversight mechanism that addresses 
principal-agent problems related to these three core policy goals: integrity 
(minimizing fraud and errors), equity (maximizing competition), and efficiency (value-
for-money). The economics approach reveals significant (opportunity and 
transaction) costs in the protest process. However, we must be careful what we wish 
for. It is important to recognize that any modifications of the protest process, or 
alternative actions and initiatives that provide oversight of the procurement process 
with the goal of promoting integrity, equity, and efficiency, will also entail significant 
(opportunity and transaction) costs as well as risks of unintended consequences.76  
The operation of the current protest system reflects an assumption that the 
costs of protests are less than the costs of relying on alternative monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms to achieve the same policy goals (integrity, equity, 
efficiency) and to: “ensure the proper functioning of the procurement system, and to 
promote confidence in the system”77 (Arrowsmith et al., 2000, p. 83).   A 
                                            
76 It is important to include transaction cost considerations in the economic analysis of alternatives 
and source selection decision (see Melese et al., 2007). These include the administrative costs of the 
award process and the costs of the monitoring and oversight of protests, audits, and other 
governance mechanisms to promote the legal integrity and economic efficiency of the procurement 
process in order to select the best possible products and services on behalf of troops and taxpayers.  
77 “Any loosening of the procurement regulatory straightjacket should be accompanied by, and linked 
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recommendation is to evaluate the costs and benefits of alternative approaches that 
might improve procurement outcomes—including human capital investments and 
third-party governance mechanisms. The full costs of protests must include the 
visible costs of actual protests as well as the largely hidden costs of defensive 
practices (Buy-offs, Fed-mail, and over-deterrence) to avoid protests. 
Table 1 offers a proposed framework to collect data and expert opinions to 
help evaluate alternative governance mechanisms. The first column lists the 
evaluation criteria, including the procurement policy goals of integrity, equity, and 
efficiency. To achieve these policy goals, a brief list (portfolio) of possible alternative 
governance mechanisms appears across the top.  
Bid protests, whistle-blower lawsuits, and integrity pacts are examples of 
decentralized third-party governance mechanisms. Internal audits, external audits, 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), and IG investigations are examples of 
centralized oversight mechanisms. Centralized and decentralized oversight 
mechanisms can act either as complements or substitutes. Carefully crafted human 
capital investments (training, incentive schemes, etc.) can also substitute for more 
costly centralized and decentralized oversight.78 
                                                                                                                                       
system should also be accompanied by an increase in criminal penalties for procurement corruption” 
(Arrowsmith et al., 2000, p. 83). 
78 For example, major investments in training and recruiting experienced procurement officials and in 
establishing new policies to reward successful acquisition outcomes could be matched with a change 
at the GAO to adopt the Court of Federal Claims (COFC) default of innocent until proven guilty in not 
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Table 1. Evaluation of Alternative Governance Mechanisms: Human Capital 
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The stated goal of this project is to offer senior decision-makers a useful 
framework and perspective for evaluating, articulating, and supporting protest policy 
recommendations that improve procurement outcomes. A valuable exercise would 
be to refine and extend the list of alternative approaches that appears in Table 1, 
identifying actions and initiatives that substitute for (and complement) protests. 
Combining data with best practices and expert opinion to fill the cells of the matrix 
would reveal advantages and disadvantages of alternative mixes (portfolios) under 
investigation. The results in each cell could be interpreted through a stoplight chart, 
such as that illustrated in the second column of Table 1. The last two rows of 
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any recommended changes in the protest process to improve procurement 
outcomes.79  
Completing a table like the one illustrated in Table 1 requires evaluating the 
benefits (advantages) and costs (disadvantages) of the different alternatives.80 
Traditional centralized oversight mechanisms rely on government officials to allocate 
enforcement resources. This generally involves an auditor or inspector general who 
is independent of the regulated activity deciding which (pre- or post-award) 
procurements to review. This study focuses on the benefits and costs of the bid 
protest system, a decentralized governance mechanism in which the allocation of 
enforcement resources is mostly decided by self-interested contractors. 
                                            
79 The matrix could also help evaluate any offsetting (or complementary) actions or initiatives that 
might be required to implement proposed changes in the bid protest process in order to reduce 
overall costs and delays.  
80 Whereas protests tend to be input focused, audits and investigations tend to be more 
output/outcome focused—although they can also review the input phase. Given sufficient resources 
(increasing transparency, the probability of a review) and enforcement power (improving 
accountability, the consequences of a good or bad review), centralized audits and investigations can 
have a powerful impact to reduce fraud and errors and increase competition. Since they are initiated 
by government officials, centralized approaches also tend to avoid many of the pitfalls of protests 
such as Fed-mail, Buy-offs, and over-deterrence—which means the full costs of conducting these are 
more transparent. A disadvantage of audits is that enforcement is often weak or non-existent, except 
perhaps when the media picks up the story. Also, random audits are likely to review properly 
conducted procurements, while protests only tend to occur when there is a suspicion of impropriety. 
Two further observations are helpful: (1) the auditor may be poorly informed relative to a disappointed 
bidder, and (2) auditors generally lack the profit motive that drives the behavior of a protester (private 
attorney general). The decentralized enforcement of disappointed bidders offers better alignment if 
self-interested private attorneys general have better information than auditors about deviations from 
procurement statutes and regulations. Another cost is the opportunity costs of auditors and their staffs 
and the agency that is undergoing an audit, which includes costs (and opportunity costs) of collecting 
and analyzing information. An internal audit relies on ex-post auditing by entities within the agency 
(such as the IG, the competition advocate, or DCAA). Audit authorities could recommend rewards or 
punishments for procurement officials, adjustments in acquisition procedures and techniques, or 
payments of damages to wrongfully excluded offerors. An external audit is one alternative; it relies on 
ex-post auditing by external observers (such as the GAO’s auditing unit). Audit authorities could 
recommend rewards or punishments for procurement officials, adjustments in acquisition procedures 
and techniques, or payments of damages to wrongfully excluded offerors. Other approaches include 
ADR and other preventions and resolution tools addressed in the Better Acquisition Management 
companion report; posting a bond, bringing in an auditor to bless the procurement, using a trusted 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 52 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
F. A Brief Review of the U.S. Federal Bid Protest System 
In the United States, a disappointed (or prospective) bidder/offeror has three 
major options to contest the award of a federal contract. Protests can be filed with 
the procuring agency (C.F.R., 48 § 33.103[c]), with the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) (U.S.C., 31 § 3551 et. seq), or with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims 
(COFC) (U.S.C., 28 § 1491[b]).  The distribution of protests filed over the last several 
years at the GAO and the COFC is illustrated in Tables 2 and 3. A weakness noticed 
in the literature is that: “Unfortunately, no comprehensive statistics exist that 
summarize the number of protests at the agency level or the success rates of such 
protests” (Schaengold et al., 2009, p. 4).  
A recommendation of this study is for the DoD to collect data that summarizes 
agency-level protests (in a manner similar to the data routinely displayed for GAO 
protests and the COFC). Also, because most agency protest decisions are not 
published, there is limited transparency, and the lack of a record of precedent 
deprives future protesters—and the agency itself—of the benefit of the agency’s 
reasoning on prior decisions. 
The number of bid protests filed with the COFC is a small fraction of those 
filed with the GAO. For example, in FY2007, protests filed with the COFC (70) were 
less than 5% of those filed with the GAO (1,411). As a consequence, the discussion 
below focuses on GAO protests. 
According to Worthington and Goldsman (1998), two (possibly conflicting) 
concerns are reflected in any protest process: efficiency and effectiveness. An 
“efficient” bid protest process ensures that protests are handled expeditiously, 
thereby minimizing disruptions to the acquisition process.  An “effective” system 
(related to the criteria of integrity in the matrix in Table 1) ensures that disappointed 
bidders are given a forum to air their grievances and that agency officials are held 
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Table 2. GAO Bid Protest Statistics, FY2001–FY2008 
(Schaengold et al., 2009, p. 255) 
FY 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Protests Filed 1,146        1,204        1,352      1,485      1,356      1,327      1,411        1,652     




311 256 290 365 306 249 335 291
Sustained in 
Whole or Part
66(21%) 41(16%) 50(17%) 75(21%) 71(23%) 72(29%) 91(27%) 60(21%)
Effectiveness Rate 33% 33% 33% 34% 37% 39% 38% 42%
Cases Resolved 
Through ADR




63(12%) 23(5%) 74(13%) 56(9%) 41(8%) 51(11%) 41(8%) 32(6%)
 
Table 3. Bid Protests at the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, FY2000–FY2007 
(Schaengold et al., 2009, p. 255) 
FY 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Number of Cases 
Involving Bid Protests 54 57 39 55 69 61 73 70
Percentage of Cases 
Involving Bid Protests 6.8% 7.3% 2.6% 1.8% 2.9% 3.6% 6.8% 6.4%  
Two of the three U.S. protest forums are described in detail in Appendix 1:, 
Agency-Level Protests and the GAO Bid Protest Process.  Appendix 1 offers a more 
precise and detailed overview that includes protest process flowcharts developed for 




















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 55 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
III. An Economic Framework & Potential 
Change Candidates: A Decision Model 
As discussed earlier, the objective of firms doing business with the 
government is to maximize profits, i.e., to provide a market-based return on capital 
to shareholders. Meanwhile, the intent of a protest system is to provide a 
decentralized governance mechanism to oversee the integrity, equity, and efficiency 
of the procurement process. Although the government’s intent is for protesters to act 
as a type of third-party oversight of government buyers (procurement officials, etc.), 
the reality is that because protesters themselves are in competition as sellers, they 
have conflicting objectives. Their motivation is not simply to detect errors and fraud, 
but to maximize profits.  
As this study has highlighted, profit maximization can lead firms to undertake 
protests for reasons substantially different from, and fundamentally opposed to, the 
government’s objectives (i.e., to minimize errors and fraud on the part of 
procurement officials and to increase competition). Firms use the protest process 
strategically to improve their competitive bargaining position and are likely to be 
equally strategic in their decision of whether to protest an award.  
The dual objective of this section is to present an economic framework of a 
representative bidder’s decision whether to (i) participate/compete in a public 
procurement and (ii) protest in the event they lose. This requires converting the 
legal/regulatory protest process flowchart (illustrated in Figure 4) into a 
representative bidder’s decision tree (similar to Figure 2). This exercise reveals a set 
of variables under government control that can influence a contractor’s protest 
decision. Among these variables are key factors that impact the expected benefits 
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A. Highlights of the GAO’s Bid Protest System: A Protest 
Process Flowchart 
Figure 4 offers a detailed process flow of actions and events that impact three 
key players: a protester, the agency defending against the protest, and the GAO.  It 
is useful to highlight several aspects of Figure 4.81  
An agency has 5 options with which to respond to the filing of a protest.  The 
first option for the agency is to move to dismiss the protest on the grounds that the 
protest was frivolous, meritless, or outside the GAO’s jurisdiction.  This option allows 
the agency to avoid up to 100 days of delay (the statutory time limit for a GAO bid 
protest); to preserve the agency’s acquisition strategy, its competitive range, or its 
award decision; to prevent discovery and extensive production of documents; to 
save the agency’s legal and administrative costs of defending the protest; and to 
avoid potential payments of protester’s legal fees as well as protester’s bid and 
proposal preparation costs.  The protester can respond to the agency motion by 
withdrawing the protest or opposing the motion.  If the protester opposes the motion, 
the GAO may dismiss the protest with a summary dismissal, dismiss with a 
dismissal opinion, or refuse to dismiss the protest.         
The agency’s second option is to undertake corrective action by affording the 
protester some form of relief.  This option allows the agency to avoid up to 100 days 
of delay (the statutory time limit for a GAO bid protest); to save the agency’s legal 
and administrative costs of defending the protest; and to avoid potential payments of 
protester’s legal fees.  However, corrective action may involve changing or reversing 
the agency’s acquisition strategy, its competitive range, or its award decision; 
payment of protester’s bid and proposal preparation costs; or other relief to the 
protester.  The protester may either agree to the corrective action or request further 
                                            
81 This process description is further described in Chapter II(C), Guide to Agency Management of the 
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corrective action.  An agency may refuse further corrective action and proceed to a 
third or fourth option. 
The agency’s third option is to engage in alternative dispute resolution (ADR).   
This option allows the agency to avoid up to 100 days of delay (the statutory time 
limit for a GAO bid protest); to save the agency’s legal and administrative costs of 
defending the protest; and to avoid potential payments of protester’s legal fees.  
However, corrective action may involve changing or reversing the agency’s 
acquisition strategy, its competitive range, or its award decision; payment of 
protester’s bid and proposal preparation costs; or other relief to the protester.  The 
protester may either agree to use ADR, or disagree to use ADR.  If the protester 
agrees to use ADR, the ADR can take the form of negotiation assistance facilitated 
by the GAO or ADR without GAO involvement, such as direct negotiation, mediation, 
or arbitration.  If ADR succeeds, it can result in corrective action or withdrawal of a 
protest.  If ADR fails, the agency can proceed to option 4, agency defense by 
agency report.  The regulatory timing for filing the agency report within 30 days from 
the date of award is not affected by the agency’s decision to pursue ADR.   
The agency’s fourth option is to defend the procurement by filing its defense 
in the form of an agency report within 30 days of the filing of the protest.  This option 
allows the agency an opportunity to protect its acquisition strategy, competitive 
range decision, or award decision.  However, the agency will incur a delay of up to 
100 days (the statutory time limit for a GAO bid protest) and incur legal and 
administrative costs of defending against a protest.  Further, if an agency takes this 
option and subsequently loses the protest, it will be obligated to pay the protester’s 
legal fees and costs.  If an agency takes this option and subsequently loses a 
protest after a “best interests” override was put in place, the law authorizes the GAO 
to recommend relief regardless of any impact on the program.   
A protester may file opposing comments or withdraw a protest.  The protester 
may also file a supplemental protest.  The agency is able to exercise the same 
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protest, and GAO will consolidate all protests together for a single resolution.  The 
protester may also request a hearing.  The GAO may conduct a hearing on one or 
all protests, in which case the parties will be asked to file post-hearing comments.   
Following the full exchange of comments, the GAO may conduct outcome 
prediction ADR.  During outcome prediction, GAO will recommend either to sustain 
or to deny the protest.  If the GAO recommends to sustain the protest and the 
agency agrees, an agency may take corrective action in accordance with GAO 
recommendation.  The protest is then dismissed as academic.  If the GAO 
recommends a denial or if the agency or the protester disagree with the outcome 
prediction, they can ask GAO to issue an opinion.   
Once the GAO issues an opinion with or without outcome prediction, the 
parties may ask for reconsideration.  If the GAO opinion (including the 
reconsideration request) denies the protest, the protester may file a protest at the 
Court of Federal Claims.  If the GAO opinion (including reconsideration) sustains the 
protest and recommends relief, the agency can provide the protester the 
recommended relief or refuse to follow GAO’s recommendation.  The GAO will 
report the agency to Congress and recommend sanctions or relief including private 
relief legislation, rescission or cancellation of funds, Congressional investigation, or 
other action.  Further, if the agency refuses to follow the GAO’s recommendation, it 
can request the Office of Federal Procurement Policy within the Office of 
Management and Budget, or the Office of Legal Counsel within the Justice 
Department, to issue an opinion supporting its position.         
In addition to the fourth option, the agency may also undertake the fifth 
option: a request for an express option.  This request must be made not later than 5 
days after protest filing.  Under this option, the agency would defend the 
procurement by filing its defense in the form of an agency report within 30 days of 
the filing of the protest.  This option allows the agency an opportunity to protect its 
acquisition strategy, competitive range decision, or award decision.  However, the 
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statutory time limit for a GAO bid protest) and incur legal and administrative costs of 
defending against a protest.  Further, if an agency takes this option and 
subsequently loses a protest, it will be obligated to pay a protester’s legal fees and 
costs.  If an agency takes this option and subsequently loses a protest after a “best 
interests” override was put in place, the law authorizes the GAO to recommend relief 
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B. The Disappointed Bidder’s Problem: A Decision Tree 
The final GAO opinion, issued within 100 days (or 65 days under the express 
option), will either sustain or deny the protest. If the protest is sustained, then the 
protester earns an award, represented by XA. If the protest is dismissed or denied, 
then we assume the protester settles for (or pursues) the next-best alternative 
project whose value is Xo. 
Recognizing the competing interests and conflicting objectives of the different 
players in the protest process—i.e. assuming the protester maximizes profits, 
including future business opportunities; the agency maximizes troop value for 
taxpayer money; and the GAO acts as an arbiter—suggests converting the protest 
process flow into a protester decision tree.  Streamlining and simplifying the protest 
process illustrated in detail in Figure 4 suggests a straightforward decision tree 
similar to that illustrated in Figure 2. This new decision tree offers a slight extension 
to the disappointed bidder decision problem developed earlier.  
The decision tree illustrated in Figure 5 underpins the economic framework 
developed in this section. The disappointed bidder must decide whether to file or not 
file a protest. As discussed earlier, a typical firm will calculate the expected value 
(profit) of filing a protest, i.e., its expected benefits and expected costs. It will only file 
if it forecasts greater profits from protesting than from not protesting. In terms of 
expected benefits, “[p]rotesters … care about two … questions: how difficult is it … 
to win, and does winning a protest bring any meaningful relief” (Gordon, 2006, p. 
10). The latter question relates the magnitude of the award from winning a protest, 
XA. The first question is slightly more involved in that it requires two steps. 
As indicated above, in order to be successful, a protest must first be 
determined to have merit (with probability PM) before it can be decided by the GAO. 
Then, given that it has merit, it must be sustained (the conditional probability PS). 
“Where the protest survives initial screening, the critical question … will be the 
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A recent RAND study discovered that a total of 836 protests were filed with 
the GAO against the USAF over the period FY2000–FY2008. Only 201 were found 
to have merit and of those, 29 were sustained (these calculations were based on 
root B number counts derived from PACTS, Camm et al., 2009, p. 6). Based on this 
USAF data, less than 25% of protests filed were found to have merit. The probability 
(relative frequency) that a protest has merit is PM = 201/836 = 0.24 = 24%.  Of those 
201 protests found to have merit, less than 15% were sustained. The conditional 
probability that a protest will be sustained given that it has merit is PS = 29/201 = 
0.144 = 14%. These probabilities (relative frequencies) can be used by a 
representative bidder interested in competing for an Air Force contract simply by 
inserting them into a decision tree like the one in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. A Disappointed Bidder Decision Tree 
Probability Denied  
1– PM x PS = 96.5% 
Successful Protest 
Probability Sustain    
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Data for the period FY2001–2008 is presented in Table 4 for the Department 
of Defense (DoD) as a whole. The conditional probability that a protest will be 
sustained, PS, appears in the fifth row in Figure 9 and is called the DoD Sustain 
Rate.  
Table 4. Protests Filed with the GAO against DoD Procurements 
(JAT, 2009, p. 9) 
 
This data indicates that in the most recent year of the sample (FY2008), for all 
of the DoD, PS = 0.20. In other words, only 20% of the protests found to have merit 
were subsequently sustained. An investment in transparency by publishing merit and 
sustain rates might pay for itself through a reduction in the rate of protests if it serves 
as a deterrent to disappointed bidders who might otherwise be tempted to protest 
due to an optimism bias.82 
                                            
82 Note that if companies use protests as a strategic bargaining/negotiating tool to extract 
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C. Expected Benefits of Winning a Protest and Expected 
Costs of Losing 
There is only one way a disappointed bidder can win a protest: the protest 
must have merit and be sustained given that it has merit. In calculating its expected 
benefits from filing and winning a protest, a contractor multiplies the (tiny) probability 
that its protest is sustained (i.e., the probability that the protest has merit times the 
probability that it is sustained, given that it has merit, or PM x PS = 24% x 14.4% = 
3.5% = 29/836), by the value of the award, XA for example, see Figure 5).  
However, deducted from the award, a firm must subtract its overall bidding 
costs (CB) and any filing fees (CF), and anticipate whatever costs it decides to invest 
to conduct the protest (I). In general, the expected value of winning a protest to a 
firm that loses the competition is as follows: 
Expected Benefit of Winning = (PM x PS) x [XA - CB - CF - I]   (1) 
While there is only one way the disappointed bidder can win a protest—the 
protest must have merit (PM = 0.24) and must be sustained given that it has merit (PS 
= 0.144)—there are two ways it can lose the protest: (i) if the protest is dismissed, 
with probability (1 - PM) = 0.76, or (ii) if the protest has merit but is subsequently 
denied, perhaps due to lack of prejudice, with probability PM (1 - PS) = 0.76 x 0.86 = 
0.65. Therefore, a disappointed bidder’s expected cost calculation includes two 
components, or two ways to lose a protest.  
In the event that a bidder loses the protest, the value of the next-best 
alternative project (or agency settlements) is given by Xo. This is offset by the usual 
suspects (bidding costs, filing costs, and any protest-related investments the firm 
lost in the current competition). We add possible penalties, C1, in the event the 
protest is found to be without merit (e.g., dismissed as frivolous), and C2, in the 
                                                                                                                                       
by evidence that the large majority of protests are found to be without merit, and that the majority of 
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event the protest has merit but is ultimately denied.83 In general, the expected value 
of losing the protest to a firm that loses the competition is given by the following 
equation:  
Expected Cost of Losing = (1 - PM) [Xo – CB – CF – I - C1] + PM(1 - PS)[Xo – CB – CF 
– I - C2]    (2) 
The first term represents the protest being dismissed and the second 
represents the protest being denied. A streamlined version of a representative 
disappointed bidder’s protest decision of whether to file a protest is illustrated in 
Figure 5.  
D. Strategies to Reduce Protests 
As mentioned in Section II, reducing protests can be accomplished in two 
ways: by reducing the expected benefits of winning a protest, shown in Equation 1, 
or by increasing the expected costs, shown in Equation 2. Equation 1 demonstrates 
that reducing the expected benefits of filing a protest could be accomplished by 
reducing awards/payoffs in the event that protests are sustained, XA, or by 
increasing filing fees (and/or other related expenses), CF. Reducing the expected 
benefits of a protest could also be accomplished by reducing the probability that a 
protest has merit, PM, or that it is sustained given that it has merit, PS.  
The probability a protest has merit, PM, is likely to be positively correlated with 
agency errors, E, and fraud, F. So, if PM = PM (E, F), then any investment 
(efforts/initiatives) to reduce fraud or errors will reduce the probability a protest has 
merit and the expected benefits of a protest. 
Similarly, we can assume that the probability a protest is sustained given that 
it has merit (or corrective action is taken), PS, is positively correlated with fraud and 
                                            
83 There is precedent for quantifying the latter cost in that the COFC Rule 65 requires a disappointed 
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errors as well as correlated with the amount of protest-related investments made by 
the firm, I, and the quality (technical) measure of effectiveness that the firm offers in 
its bid proposal, MOE. However, it is assumed this probability is inversely correlated 
with the contract bid price offered by the firm, P.  Ceteris paribus, the higher the 
price offered by the firm relative to its competitors, the less likely a protest will be 
sustained given that it has merit, such that PS = PS(E,F,I,MOE,P).84  
Since I, MOE, and P are all contractor decision variables, the government’s 
attempt to reduce the probability that a protest is sustained given that it has merit is 
once again left with investments (efforts/initiatives) to reduce fraud or errors.  
Equation 2 shows that increasing the expected costs could be accomplished 
with similar actions and initiatives, but it also includes the possibility of assessing 
penalties (or increasing costs), C1 and C2, or somehow raising the value of the next-
best alternative, Xo (possibly by unbundling the contract or with shared 
procurements, i.e., split buys).  
E. A Representative Bidder Model 
The protest problem just discussed is actually a piece of a bigger profit 
maximization problem, that any representative bidder/offeror faces upon entering a 
competition for a government contract.85 The representative bidder model described 
below allows for a more detailed examination of this problem.  
                                            
84 It seems reasonable to assume that the lower the quality (MOE) and the higher the price (P) a firm 
offers, the less likely it is to be prejudiced (or the lower its chance of winning the competition), and, 
therefore, the lower the probability that the GAO will sustain a protest given that it has merit. 
85 Developing the broader problem could offer important new insights. For example, suppose the 
government decided to raise filing fees (CF), assess penalties if a protest is summarily dismissed as 
frivolous (i.e., cost, C1), or impose a “loser pays” penalty if a protest is ultimately denied  (i.e., cost, 
C2) in order to raise protest costs and limit the number of protests (i.e., demand curves slope down). 
The broader representative bidder model might reveal that bid prices, P, offered by representative 
bidders would tend to increase, so that we might discover that some of the cost is ultimately shifted 
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Fortunately, the expected benefits of winning a protest, shown in Equation 1, 
and the expected costs of losing a protest, shown in Equation 2, are major 
components of the representative bidder’s profit function. In fact, a representative 
bidder’s total expected profits, V, consist of only two additional components. The first 
is the expected value of winning the competition and the second is the expected 
value of losing the competition.  
The probability that a representative bidder wins the competition, PW, is 
assumed to be negatively correlated with the price it offers (P), any agency fraud (F), 
or errors (E) and with the number of bidders (N), but positively correlated with the 
quality (technical) measure of effectiveness it offers (MOE), such that PW = 
PW(P,E,F,N,MOE). Assuming the government requires a fixed quantity, Q (e.g., 179 
KC-X aerial tanker refuelers), the representative bidder’s problem involves choosing 
a price (P), quality/schedule (MOE), and how much to invest in post-award, protest-
related expenditures (I) in order to maximize its total profit function  
(V), where  
V = the expected value of winning the competition,  
+ the expected value of losing the competition,  
+ the expected benefit of losing the competition but winning the 
protest,  
+ the expected cost of losing the competition and losing the protest.  
Because Equation 1 is the expression for winning the protest and Equation 2 
for losing the protest, there are only two missing components in the profit function.  
The first is the expected value of winning the competition, say E(W). This is 
simply the probability of winning the competition (PW) multiplied by the payoff from 
winning. The payoff includes the award of the contract (revenues P x Q), minus 
production costs (total costs C(Q,MOE)), minus the costs of participating in the bid 
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contract award (C3).86 The expected value of winning the competition is given by the 
following equation: 
E(W) = PW [PQ - C(Q,MOE) - CB - C3].  (3) 
The second missing component in the representative bidder’s profit function 
is the expected value of losing the competition, say E(L). This is simply the 
probability of losing the competition (one minus the probability of winning), multiplied 
by the next-best alternative project, Xo, minus the bid and proposal costs, CB, such 
that 
E(L) = (1 - PW)[Xo - CB].  (4)
                                            
86 As discussed earlier, the expected costs of defending the contract award can be critical to the 
decision of whether or not a winning bidder type decides to participate. The easier it is to file a protest 
(i.e., the lower the filing costs) and the greater the probability of winning the protest (PM x PS), the 
more that losing bidder types will be attracted, but the less that winning bidder types will show up (or 
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Combining Equations (1)–(4) yields a representative bidder’s profit function, 
V. The bidder’s problem is to choose a price to charge (P), the quality/schedule to 
offer (MOE), and a prospective protest investment (I) to 
Maximize V = PW [PQ - C(Q,MOE) - CB - C3] (winning the competition) 
+ (1 - PW) [Xo - CB]   (losing the competition) 
+ (PMPS) [XA - CB - CF - I]  (winning the protest) 
+ (1 - PM) [Xo - CB - CF - I - C1] + PM(1 - PS) [Xo - CB - CF - I - C2]  
(losing the protest) 
Given this profit function, the first order conditions of an unconstrained 
optimization allow us to generate some intuitive comparative statics results. Applying 
the Envelope Theorem reveals the impact of changes in the variables on a 
representative bidder’s expected profits for several of the variables. A summary of 
these results is provided in Table 5, and a discussion appears below.  
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The greater the number of bidders, bid and proposal costs, penalties, or filing 
fees, the lower the expected value of profits to a representative bidder from the 
competition (V). The greater the protest award, quantity of the contract, or value of 
alternative projects, the greater the expected value of profits to a representative 
bidder from the competition (V).  
An interpretation of the representative bidder model points to several of the 
potential change candidates discussed earlier. Bidders control the price they charge 
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win a protest (I), so the government controls the remaining variables that appear in 
Figure 10. 
1. Reducing Expected Benefits 
To reduce expected benefits, the first step is to identify feasible ways to lower 
the probability of successful protests. This involves reducing agency errors (E), and 
fraud and favoritism (F). This can be accomplished by (i) investing in training and 
experience, (ii) linking pay and promotion to successful procurement outcomes, (iii) 
ensuring the transparency of the assessment criteria, (iv) ensuring the transparency 
and accountability of the evaluation and selection process, (v) making companies 
aware of the low probability of awards being overturned, and (vi) substituting 
protests for alternatives such as random (internal and external) audits and 
investigations, encouraging alternative dispute resolution (ADR), etc. Alternatively, 
the probability of success would drop if the GAO narrowed standing (i.e., eligibility) 
or raised the threshold required for a protest to have merit.  
Whistle-blower lawsuits and integrity pacts are examples of decentralized 
third-party governance mechanisms. Internal audits, external audits, alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR), and IG investigations are examples of centralized 
oversight mechanisms. Centralized and decentralized oversight mechanisms can be 
either complements or substitutes for protests, but regardless, by deterring fraud and 
errors, they will lower the probability of a successful protest.  
Similarly, carefully crafted human capital investments (such as improving 
public-sector pay and training for procurement officials) can also substitute for more 
costly centralized and decentralized oversight. Valuable human capital investments 
include initiatives to build integrity (e.g., ethics training, clearly stated and widely 
distributed standards of conduct, etc.), acquisition training (e.g., augmenting skills 
and experience), and pay for performance (or other ways to align incentives to 
improve procurement outcomes). Internal audits, external audits, investigations, 
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increase transparency and accountability. In combination, these investments offer a 
potential return in terms of reduced fraud and errors that is reflected in a lower 
probability of a successful protest. Investing in training, linking pay and promotion to 
successful procurement outcomes, and hiring more experienced acquisition 
personnel will reduce protests and simultaneously build confidence in the integrity of 
the solicitation and selection process, boosting the expected benefits of participation 
and therefore the benefits of competition. 
The second step is to identify feasible ways to reduce the payoff from a 
successful protest. For example, by (i) reducing the award (such as by unbundling 
the contract vertically, in terms of different stages of production, or horizontally, in 
terms of quantities); (ii) sharing the award (split buys); or (iii) keeping records of 
protests by firms and using this information in future competitions (i.e., using a 
company’s reputation), etc.  
2. Increasing Expected Costs 
To increase the expected costs of a protest requires increasing either the 
probability of losing a protest or the negative payoff associated with losing the 
protest (or both). Strategies might include (i) restricting the filing window or raising 
filing fees to reflect the government’s (agency and GAO) complete (visible and 
hidden) costs to administer a protest (CF), (ii) requiring firms to post a bond (as in the 
case of the COFC) to compensate for delays in the event the protest is denied, or 
(iii) assessing penalties for clearly strategic (frivolous/nuisance) protests and/or for 
those that have some merit, but are not sustained, e.g., loser pays, corresponding to 
penalties (C1, C2).  In Figure 5. 
In lowering the expected benefits from a protest or in raising the expected 
costs, the challenge is to choose the most cost-effective portfolio of initiatives that 
aligns incentives and that adequately monitors and enforces procurements in order 
to reduce the risk of fraud and errors and to encourage competition. In searching for 
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capital as well as centralized (audits and investigations) and decentralized (bid 
protests) third-party governance mechanisms. 
F. An Application of the Model: The KC-X Procurement 
An excellent illustration of the powerful role of incentives in the protest 
process is the USAF’s search for a new aerial tanker to replace the KC-135 fleet. 
The two qualified bidders (Boeing and Northrop Grumman–EADS [NG–EADS]) both 
offered mature designs. Yet procurement efforts have been consistently 
disappointing. In this case, the usual explanation of insufficient technical maturity is 
not an excuse. Both candidates (the KC-767 and KC-30) have been developed for 
other air forces, have been successfully delivered (deployed), and are currently 
operational. The breakdown has been in the conduct of the U.S. competition.  
Boeing’s 2008 protest of the KC-45 contract award to Northrop Grumman–
Eads (the KC-30 proposal) was a serious obstacle in finding a supplier for the next 
USAF aerial tanker. As illustrated in the representative bidder model in Figure 5 
above, the decision to protest is influenced by a number of factors—especially (a) 
the probability of a successful protest (i.e., the probability of merit, and the 
probability the protest is sustained given that it has merit), (b) the expected return (or 
payoff) from a successful protest, (c) the cost of conducting a protest (i.e., filing fees 
and other expenses, including opportunity costs of the assets committed), and (d) 
the value of the next-best alternative project available to the firm. 
When there are only two potential KC-X suppliers,  this encourages the 
strategic use of protests by firms as a bargaining tool. For example, either firm can 
hold up the procurement process to gain strategic advantage by issuing a threat not 
to respond to the Request for Proposal (RFP)—i.e., threatening to leave the DoD 
with a non-competitive procurement that violates the spirit of the CICA. In fact, both 
Boeing and NG–EADS have successfully used similar hold-up strategies. In one 
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protest attempt to re-compete the KC-X contract award was aborted. The latest twist 
in 2010 is that one of the candidates threatened not to respond to the RFP.   
It might appear that it should be possible to write an RFP acceptable to both 
suppliers that would result in a competition less vulnerable to protest. Unfortunately, 
the RFP “fairness” constraint likely interferes with the aim of conducting a protest-
resistant source selection process.87 
Although it may be useful to aspire, as the Air Force Chief of Staff has said, to 
a “bulletproof” RFP (Gnau, 2009) and a “perfecto” competition (Bennett, 2009)—with 
a view to lowering the probability of a successful protest—this is only part of the 
story. The other part is to understand the overwhelming incentives created by the 
extraordinary benefits (payoff) of the KC-X contract. The magnitude of the contract 
strongly encourages  either company  to protest not being selected even if there’s 
only  a slight chance of success. At the DoD’s insistence, and with presidential 
support, the KC-X competition was specifically designed to award a large, long-term, 
winner-take-all contract. The unintended consequence has been a strong incentive 
for the losing firm to protest the award—even if that protest is unlikely to succeed.   
The losing firm’s upside is the expected return from overturning the award, in 
this case, a historically unprecedented award to the winning firm—a revenue stream 
estimated at up to $100 billion over the life of the tanker contract (e.g., see 
Johnsson, 2009).  A successful protest is likely to result in an amended competition 
(or in an entirely new competition).  Given only two serious competitors, the chances 
of winning a new competition are potentially much greater than if multiple firms were 
in competition. In this case, the chance (small probability) of an enormous payoff 
virtually guarantees protests unless artificial limits (quotas) are imposed on the 
ability to protest (similar to the limited number of reviews allowed on line calls by 
players in professional tennis). 
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Reinforcing the incentives for the two companies to protest are their 
calculations of the expected costs of conducting a protest relative to the expected 
benefits. The costs include (i) legal and other related pecuniary costs (filing fees, 
etc.), and (ii) opportunity costs of distracting the company from other possible 
pursuits and of preserving the management team and technical experts organized 
for the original competition.   
In the case of the KC-X, protest costs are trivial relative to the size of the 
contract (and potential profits). Moreover, the opportunity costs of keeping the 
management and technical teams together are likewise relatively small.  These 
opportunity costs include the loss of opportunities to use that team to compete for 
other business. In this case, the losing bidder is very likely to be forced out of the 
new tanker market for well over a decade, suggesting that regardless of other 
opportunities, the team’s opportunity costs of pursuing the contract will be relatively 
small. 
In short, even if the USAF was able to take significant steps to reduce the 
probability of a successful protest, or to substantially raise the costs of a protest, the 
potential payoff is so large that either firm would still face positive net expected 
benefits from protesting if they lost the competition. But there’s more to the situation. 
If the award is re-competed and that competition turns out badly, multiple protests 
are still possible; that is, it’s possible to once again overturn the award (as in the 
case of the CSAR-X). Moreover, if the GAO does not return a favorable verdict, then 
it is possible for the protester to have a second chance at protesting the award at the 
Court of Federal Claims (COFC) and to be successful there (similar to the case of 
the KC-135 support contract).88   
                                            
88 This suggests investigating alternate strategies of dealing with the dispute before it takes off. For 
instance, Boeing’s supporters in Congress used the GAO sustainment of Boeing’s protests in 2008 as 
the occasion to conduct hearings on pre-award issues such as whether USAF solicitation criteria 
properly took into account defense industrial base impacts and foreign subsidies for the Northrop 
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In this case, it appears the only real solutions to the problem are: to reduce 
the expected benefits (i.e., the payoff) from protests (including from the automatic 
stay of the procurement), to limit the grounds or number of protests allowed (which 
could be ruled unconstitutional), to require offerors to engage in ADR, and/or to 
manage the protest process in ways that ensure protesters do not obtain pre-award 
re-competition remedies with post-award arguments (e.g., by refusing to follow the 
GAO recommendation).  
Intense competition by a limited set of suppliers over relatively few major 
defense contracts provides a good business case for a losing bidder to protest even 
when the probability of success is quite small. Since the value of the contract is one 
of the few variables the Department controls, this suggests investigating alternative 
approaches to reduce the size of the contract, or else accepting the likelihood of 
persistent protests which further delay procurements. Strategies might include 
unbundling the contract to reduce the payoff or sharing the contract (a split buy).  
ADR is particularly conducive to reaching a split buy outcome. 
The split-buy option can be combined with a clever incentive mechanism to 
preserve competition over time. This study recommends that the split depend on the 
relative value of the contract offers, with the winner receiving a larger split (i.e., 
share of the procurement), the greater the difference between the highest and 
second-highest valued contractor. For example, if the second-best offer is close 
enough to the first-best offer, the contract split would be close to 50:50. If structured 
correctly, such a split strategy has the potential to retain the benefits of competition. 
It encourages contractors to submit proposals that reflect what they view as the best 
value they can provide to the government so that they obtain the largest possible 
share of the contract. Contract shares could be adjusted over time to reward 
contract performance as contractors invest in cost-reducing technologies or 
experience different learning curves. Split buys also increase competition for follow-
on contracts by preserving multiple procurement sources. This offers a constructive 
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Many of the challenges associated with bid protests in the KC-X procurement 
are, in a very real sense, a natural outcome of DoD policies. Secretary of Defense 
William Perry’s “last supper” meeting with the CEOs of major defense companies 
after the end of the Cold War (and demise of the Soviet Union) facilitated a 
significant consolidation of the American defense industrial base. An unintended 
consequence of reducing the number of bidders may have been to make the 
procurement of major complex weapons systems more prone to protests.  Large, 
winner-take-all competitions have also created strong incentives to protest contract 
awards.  
The KC-X tanker competition illustrates another problem related to bid 
protests: missed opportunities to manage the GAO protest process in ways that are 
allowed under current protest regulations.  Protesters such as Boeing can exploit 
agency errors and missed opportunities by pursuing post-award protests in order to 
obtain a pre-award remedy—for example, a new, “start-from-scratch” competition 
(which imposes delays that are in the protestor’s interest).  The Air Force could have 
reduced the likelihood of this outcome by using early alternative dispute resolution 
forums, issuing stay overrides, or by refusing to follow GAO recommendations in 
whole or in part.89  
Finally, bid protests are best viewed as part of a larger strategic game, which. 
includes possible efforts by competitors to re-shape RFPs (to influence the executive 
branch), to engage in award protests (to achieve success at the GAO, part of the 
legislative branch), to pursue litigation in federal courts (to achieve success through 
the judicial branch), and to lobby members of Congress. In the latter case, stretching 
out the procurement process through protests, and other litigation, affords time to 
mobilize political support—particularly for high-stakes awards (like the KC-X).  
                                            
89  Potential strategies and tools for expeditious and less costly resolution of protests are addressed in 
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Indeed, both Boeing and NG–EADS have been very successful in mobilizing special 
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IV. Summary and Selected Recommendations 
The goal of this study was to offer senior decision-makers a useful framework 
and perspective to evaluate, articulate, and recommend modifications of the 
government’s bid protest policy to improve procurement outcomes. A key 
contribution is to add an economics dimension to a process mostly thought of in 
legal terms.  
The legal and regulatory literature that underpins the current protest system 
reflects two fundamental beliefs: Protests (a) deter fraud and errors in government 
procurements and (b) promote competition. This study explored the first premise 
through the economist’s principal-agent framework and the second with the aid of a 
representative bidder model. The aim was to examine opportunities to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the protest process in order to enhance performance, 
cost, and schedule outcomes of Defense Department acquisition investments.  
In economics, there is no such thing as a free lunch. Operating a protest 
system is costly. A fundamental challenge identified by the Defense Department is 
the significant costs of protests to the department, which is reflected in the recent 
experience of selecting a vendor for the Air Force’s KC-X aerial tanker.  
Along with the well-documented benefits of allowing firms to protest public 
procurements come significant opportunity and transaction costs. The challenge is to 
reduce the risk of protests of critical acquisitions that result in significant cost 
overruns, schedule delays, and performance gaps, while preserving the benefits 
offered by protests to promote competition and ensure the integrity, transparency, 
and accountability of the procurement process.  
Adopting an economics perspective reveals two other crucial insights: first, 
protests can be exploited by firms as a strategic bargaining tool (Fed-mail); and 
second, governments can overreact in attempts to achieve protest-proof 
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hidden costs significantly impact acquisitions. Combined, they substantially increase 
risks of delays and cost-overruns. 
Fortunately, fighting agency errors and corruption and promoting competition 
can be done in other ways. The economics approach encourages senior leadership 
to identify and evaluate alternatives to protests that could achieve similar results at a 
lower cost. The importance of acknowledging the substantial costs of operating a 
protest system to govern procurement and encourage competition is one of the key 
insights of the study: There exists an optimum rate of protests. The optimum rate of 
protests offers the most efficient and effective way to encourage competition and 
ensure the integrity of the acquisition process while guaranteeing the best possible 
outcomes for our troops and taxpayers. 
Although it is not easy to locate this optimum, the economics approach can 
help identify and evaluate policies that move us closer to the optimum. One 
important implication is that a simple, often-stated objective such as “reducing the 
rate of successful protests” is not always appropriate. Two additional factors need to 
be considered. The first is to identify where the department is relative to the 
optimum. The second involves a careful consideration of how the department might 
choose to reduce protests. In recognizing the costs as well as benefits of a protest 
system, the economics approach suggests that reviewing portfolios of governance 
mechanisms (internal audits, external audits, independent investigations, ADR, 
integrity pacts, training, incentives, etc.) can substitute for (or complement) protests 
to improve procurement outcomes.  
If the Defense Department is facing protests above the optimum rate , then 
the burden outweighs the benefits and reducing the rate of protests is appropriate. 
This can be accomplished in two ways: by reducing the expected benefits of a 
protest to a disappointed bidder or by increasing the expected costs. This is a crucial 
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If the Defense Department is below the optimum rate, then the benefits of 
protests outweigh the extra (opportunity and transaction) costs. In this range, while 
reducing protests might appear to have positive short-run impacts, it could be at the 
expense of long-term benefits such as preserving the integrity of the procurement 
process and could sacrifice future competition. Remarkably, this report revealed two 
important cases that demonstrated that even in this range, it is possible to reduce 
protests and improve long-term outcomes. The key is to carefully consider how the 
department reduces protests.  
This study captured insights from the protest literature and offered a brief 
overview of the current protest process; it also discussed alternative governance 
mechanisms. Woven throughout were data, examples, and survey results. Two 
economic frameworks were introduced—the principal-agent model (agency theory) 
and a representative bidder model. These frameworks revealed two sets of potential 
change candidates—factors that reduce the expected benefits to a losing bidder of a 
protest and factors that raise the expected costs.  
In conclusion, many countries allow disappointed bidders to protest public 
procurements as an oversight mechanism to minimize fraud and errors by 
procurement officials. The belief is that allowing disappointed bidders to protest 
increases integrity, transparency, and accountability, and encourages competition, 
reducing the cost of public purchases. A key contribution of this study is to add an 
economics dimension to a protest process mostly thought of in legal terms. The 
economics approach suggests companies are likely to use the protest process 
strategically to improve their competitive bargaining position and will be equally 
strategic in their decision to protest an award. The goal for governments is to 
minimize the risk of protests that result in cost overruns, schedule delays, and 
performance gaps, while preserving benefits offered by protests to promote 
competition and ensure the integrity, transparency and accountability of the 
procurement process. Adopting an economics perspective reveals two other crucial 
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governments can overreact in their attempts to achieve protest-proof procurements 
(buy-offs).  In recognizing the costs as well as the benefits of a protest system, the 
economics approach invites a review of alternative portfolios of governance 
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V. Appendix 1: Selected Observations and 
Recommendations  
According to Francis, Golden, and Woods (2010), 
In Fiscal year 2009, the DoD spent nearly $384 billion on contracts for goods 
and services, … representing over 70 percent of total government contract 
spending. [This] makes it imperative for DoD to manage risk in all of its 
acquisitions to ensure that the government’s best interests are being met. … 
Clearly however, DoD has not adequately managed such risks. For example, 
its major weapons systems continue to take longer to develop, cost more, and 
deliver fewer quantities and capabilities than originally planned. (p. 1) 
A question is whether the GAO or the agencies themselves might be 
inadvertently contributing to some of these challenges through the bid protest 
oversight process. 
Poorly defined or changing requirements have contributed to increased costs, 
as well as services that did not meet the department’s needs (p. 4). … 
Recently, DoD established a multiphased, peer-review process for services 
acquisitions intended to ensure consistent and appropriate implementation of 
policy and regulations, improve the quality of contracting processes, and 
facilitate sharing best practices and lessons learned (p. 5). … 
One of the principal tools for ensuring the integrity of the competition system 
is the bid protest process. … [W]hen viewed historically, … the number of 
protests challenging contract awards in the last 5 years is relatively low. … 
The bid protest process involves a legal, adjudicative function; both the 
process and the resulting product differ from those associated with the reports 
that GAO issues in connection with its program audits and reviews (p. 9). … 
[A] protest before GAO … does not address broad programmatic issues, such 
as whether or not a weapons program is being managed effectively or 
consistent with best practices. Our decision … reaches no conclusion about 
which of the offered goods or services will best meet the agency’s needs. 
[EXCEPT FOR DETERMINING PREJUDICE] Instead, a bid protest decision 
addresses specific allegations raised by an unsuccessful offeror challenging 
particular procurement actions … contrary to procurement laws, regulations, 
or the evaluation scheme set forth in the solicitation.” We sustain a protest 
when we find that the contracting agency has not complied with procurement 
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prejudiced the protester’s chances of winning the competition for the contract. 
Evaluating offerors in a manner consistent with the solicitation’s stated ground 
rules is a requirement for conducting an impartial and objective procurement 
(p. 10). … 
 [T]here are other reasons why GAO might sustain a protest. For example, an 
agency’s evaluation may not be adequately documented, or the evaluation 
conclusions may not be supported by the record. An agency also may have 
conducted inadequate or misleading discussions, or evaluated offeror’s 
proposals in a disparate manner (p. 11). … 
GAO’s bid protest process reduces potential disruptions to DoD procurements 
as a result of three factors: (1) GAO consistently closes more than 50 percent 
of all protests … within 30 days of filing; (2) remaining DoD protests must be, 
and are, resolved with 100 days; … (3) CICA permits agencies to proceed 
with contract performance even before a protest is resolved when the goods 
or services are urgently needed, or when proceeding is in the best interests of 
the U.S. (p. 11). … 
In short, while there are challenges associated with balancing 
competing interests inherent in the protest system, public bid protest 
decisions … [provide] transparency in the procurement system and 
guidance to the procurement community, without undue disruption to 
the acquisition process (p. 12). … 
The President’s March 4, 2009, memorandum … addresses the need for 
improvement in the procurement system. … [T]he administration has tasked 
agencies with making measurable improvements in four key areas: (1) 
increasing competition, (2) reducing the use of high-risk contracting 
approaches, (3) improving the acquisition workforce, (4) determining the 
appropriate use of contractors versus federal employees (p. 12). … 
There has been a substantial increase in spending on acquisition programs 
and services, while the number of civilian and military personnel in DoD’s 
acquisition workforce has remained relatively constant, … workforce shortfalls 
have resulted in degradation of oversight … and increased workloads for 
existing staff. To supplement its … acquisition workforce, DoD relies heavily 
on contractor personnel. … Without an adequate workforce … there is an 
increased risk of poor acquisition outcomes and vulnerability to fraud, waste, 
and abuse (p. 15). … 
[DoD] is conducting a competency assessment to identify the skill sets of its 
current in-house acquisition workforce and increasing the size of its 
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The FY 2011 budget includes $864 million in RDT&E for developing a new 
generation tanker, which remains a very high priority. Initial plans call for 
procuring 179 commercial-derivative tanker aircraft to replace roughly a third 
of the current aerial refueling tanker fleet at a projected cost of $35 billion 
(DoD, 2010, p. 5) … 
To make the most of the nation’s resources entrusted to the DoD and to carry 
out its mission more effectively, the Department continues striving to improve 
the way it does business (p. 6). … 
A critical effort involves reforming the processes by which we buy weapons 
and other important systems through implementation of the Weapon System 
Acquisition Reform Act. … [The] Department is increasing the number of 
acquisition personnel by 20,000. … The FY 2011 budget request continues 
support for this transition and includes funds for training and retention 
programs that will bolster the capability and size of the acquisition workforce. 
(p. 6) … 
A. Common Bases for Protests 
In a January 2009 report, the USAF published the most common grounds for 
filing a protest that it sees: “The most common bases for protest are: improper 
evaluation of proposals, defective solicitations, improper cancellations of 
solicitations, failure to properly compete acquisitions, and failure to properly 
implement socio-economic goals (e.g., small business set asides)” (USAF, 2009 
p. 8).  These causes for protest are often based on rules the USAF introduces in its 
Requests for Proposals (RFPs) and that, in some cases, it does not follow.   
Several complaints (bid protests) might appear under a general heading that 
might be called errors (E in the model): According to recent studies (JAT, 2009; 
Gansler, Lucyshyn, & Arendt, 2009), the most common errors involve the following:  
i) Defective Solicitations: These often take the form of poorly 
constructed RFPs, usually through omitted information or 
contradictions within the solicitation.  It does not necessarily 
deal with how the agency evaluated competitors for the 
contract, but rather how the agency solicited bidders and how it 
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ii) Improper Evaluations: The improper evaluation of proposals 
can take several different forms, including unequal cost 
evaluations, relative weights, or technical evaluation factors. 
The common factor in improper evaluation claims is that the 
protestor felt the government agency violated at least one 
procurement regulation and, as a result, prejudiced the 
protesting company (E).  
iii) Improper Cancellations: Claims of improper cancellation of a 
solicitation often occur after an agency solicits bidders for a 
contract and then cancels the RFP because of a shift in demand 
(perhaps due to changes in the battlefield), or in an effort to 
conserve valuable government resources for higher priority 
projects (E). 
Defective solicitations and improper cancellations boil down to the 
government not offering the solicitation to the right competitors.  Either it did not 
consider a legitimate competitor based on reputation or on some other factor, or it 
may have violated small-business regulations by offering the solicitation to ineligible 
competitors based on their size (E). 
Another common reason (error) for filing a protest—aside from improprieties 
in the evaluation, in the RFP, or in source selection—is the failure to conduct fair and 
meaningful discussions with competitors (SSJAT, 2009, pp. 9–10). During the 
contracting process, the agency representative must treat all competitors fairly and 
impartially.  If an agency is found to have conducted unfair discussions with a 
competitor (such as only contacting one competitor or revealing evaluation 
information to one competitor but not to all that could give an unfair advantage 
[fraud]), the award of contract will likely be protested (E for error and F for fraud in 
the model). 
B. Recent Increase in the Number of Protests Filed 
Based on the information in a 2009 GAO report to Congress (p. 7), the 
number of DoD protests filed increased from 458 in FY2004 to 611 in FY2008 (see 
Figure 6).  This increase in the number of protests filed against DoD agencies may 
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each year against the DoD recently increased.90  Several potential factors could 
have contributed to this recent increase in protest filings.   
 
Figure 6. Number of DoD Protests Filed FY2004–FY2008 
(GAO, 2009) 
First, if the government does not follow its own rules when evaluating 
competitors’ proposals, it will likely see more businesses protesting contracting 
decisions.  This is the simplified reason for why the KC-X protest was sustained 
(SAF AQ,  15 September 2008, pp. 7–9)—the Air Force did not follow the rules it set 
forth in the proposal solicitation with regard to performance evaluation weights, cost 
evaluation methods, and several other self-imposed guidelines.  If an agency has 
trouble following the guidelines that it sets forth in its RFP, then companies will be 
more likely to protest its evaluations and the award of the contract (E). 
A second reason for the apparent increase in protests could be the high ops 
tempo of today’s Air Force combined with an overloaded contracting workforce.  The 
United States has been fighting two undeclared wars for almost a decade, which has 
                                            
90 Even more interesting for future research is to discover why there was such a significant drop in 
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caused an increase in workload for contracting officials. As of FY2008, the average 
contracting official was responsible for roughly $20 million of taxpayer money 
(SSJAT, 2009, Slide 22),  roughly three times the level of responsibility per worker in 
FY2001.  Since the average worker is now responsible for more taxpayer money 
than in the past, it is possible that details are being missed on these larger, more 
complex contracts, which can lead to more protests (E). 
Another reason for the recent increase in protests is that the government is 
moving toward larger, less frequent procurements.  One example is Alliant, “a 10-
year, $50 billion contract that replaces three expiring contracts” 
(http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=402260) (XA and Xo in the model). 
Because the stakes of winning a contract are high, it is critical for companies 
to win those contracts to survive financially; it also should be expected that in order 
to have another shot at the prize, companies who lose a contract will protest if they 
felt prejudiced (XA; Xo). 
Also, some contracts are only renewed once every several years—for 
example, the Air Force will not need a new tanker each year, so the winner of that 
contract will have a guaranteed customer base for a significant period.  Companies 
who win government contracts will have an advantage over their competitors for the 
life of those contracts, so government contracts are prizes worth fighting for via 
protest in the event that an opponent is chosen for the award (XA; Xo). 
As indicated several times in this report, companies will likely file protests if 
the expected benefits of filing outweigh the expected costs.  Assuming the end goal 
for any company is to maximize the value to shareholders, the decision to protest in 
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outweigh the cost of filing in addition to the opportunity cost of using those resources 
elsewhere to increase the odds of winning other contracts.91   
Another possible contributing factor to the recent increase in protests filed is 
the increase in DoD procurement spending.  As previously mentioned, contractors 
are responsible for almost three times as many taxpayer dollars today as they were 
eight years ago.  This increased workload can be attributed to increases in defense 
contract spending over the last decade.  From FY2000–FY2008, DoD contract 
spending increased from $140 billion to $325 billion, as shown in Figure 7 ( 
Schwartz, 2009, p. 16).  As the DoD spends more money on contracting by 
increasing both the number of contracts and the dollar value of those contracts, from 
the representative bidder model, it follows that as the award (XA) increases, the 
number of contract protests will also increase.92 
                                            
91 Other costs exist for companies, including possible loss of reputation and future consideration on 
contracts, but consider for a moment the monetary cost of filing protests.  According to Watson & 
Associates, LLC, a business law practice, the cost of attorney’s fees for filing a protest typically 
average about $4,500.  For large companies, this cost is trivial in relation to the potential benefit of 
winning a multimillion (or billion) dollar protest.  However, for smaller businesses, this cost might be 
significant and could strongly impact a decision of whether to file a protest.  This idea could be tested 
by examining protest data and the net worth of companies that file protests to see if they are 
positively correlated.   
92 A final contributing factor to the recent increase in the number of protests filed is the increase in 
GAO jurisdiction on what kinds of cases it can hear.  “Congress expanded GAO’s jurisdiction in 
FY2007 to include hearing protests on task orders, A-76 contracts, and Transportation Security 
Administration contracts” (Schwartz, 2009, p. 7). This statutory expansion of the GAO’s bid protest 








Figure 7. DoD Contract Spending, FY2000–FY2008 
It is important to note that despite the recent increase in bid protests, the 
long-run trend is favorable. The number of protests challenging DoD contracts over 
the last five years is relatively low when examined over the last twenty years.  In 
FY1989, 1,490 protests were filed against the DoD; in FY2008, only 611 protests 
were filed, a 59% decrease over this twenty-year period (see Figure 8; GAO,  2009, 
p. 7).   
Thus, while the number of protests filed in recent years has seen a relatively 
small increase, the number of protests filed when viewed historically is less than half 
of what it was twenty years ago.  This suggests that while there are always 
improvements that can be made, the procurement system seems to be working the 
way it should be and that it has been improving over the last two decades by 
reducing the number of protests filed.93  There is no conclusive evidence that during 
the last eight years the number of decisions with merit have significantly increased.   
                                            
93  Between FY2001 and FY2008 the number of merit decisions for GAO protests stayed relatively 
constant around 300 decisions.  During that same time period, DoD merit decisions stayed constant 
around 175 decisions (see Figure 9).   








Figure 8. Number of Protests Filed to the GAO, FY1989–FY2008 
(GAO, 2009) 
The remedy offered in an agency protest can either be monetary (such as 
paying attorney’s fees and/or the cost of filing a protest, as recommended by the 
GAO in the event of a sustain decision) to compensate the protestor, or can be the 
voluntary re-solicitation for proposals or reopening of discussions in order to correct 
the prejudice the agency created.  This non-monetary form of compensation costs 
the agency time, money, and other resources that can delay projects and adversely 
impact the mission. 
Recall the earlier recommendation that the GAO rethink its measure called 
the effectiveness rate since it can easily incorporate Fed-mail and Buy-offs. 
Nevertheless, several potential root causes have been identified to explain increases 
in the effectiveness rate.  According to an April 2009 subcommittee report to the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, five possible 
root causes explain the increase in effectiveness rates (JAT, 2009, pp. 3–4). 
The first cause identified is acquisition complexity.  Since FY2001, the 
number of large cost complex procurements that typically involve performance-
based contracts have steadily increased (JAT, 2009, p. 3).  Larger and more 
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proportional to the number of protests filed.  As more protests are filed, more aid will 
be given to protestors—either through sustain decisions or voluntary aid—which will 
increase the effectiveness rate. 
The second possible root cause for the increase in the effectiveness rate is 
an increase in ops tempo. 
The number of contract actions being processed including procurements 
related to urgent operational requirements have grown significantly in the past 
several years due to enhanced military operations worldwide and associated 
deployments.  This increase in workload makes the procurement process 
more susceptible to mistakes. (JAT, 2009, p. 3) 
This, in turn, leads to an increase in effectiveness rate.  The DoD needs quick 
resolution of protests in order to have the promised goods or services of the contract 
delivered. As a result, it is possible that the DoD would be inclined to voluntarily give 
aid to protestors in order to speed the process along to reach a settlement and 
complete the mission. 
Risk aversion is another possible root cause for the increase in the 
effectiveness rate.  “The increase in voluntary corrective actions (including Fed-mail 
and Buy-offs) may be an indication that DoD activities are less willing to let GAO 
render a decision that could bring criticism to their agency” (JAT, 2009, p. 3).  
Litigation risk is a large concern for government agencies because the threat of 
litigation risks large amounts of valuable resources such as time, money, and 
manpower.  These resources could be put to use elsewhere, so avoiding litigation is 
ideal.  Unfortunately, literature review and survey data in the companion report 
suggest that agencies are failing to avoid litigation to the extent allowed by current 
laws and regulations (Benishek et al., 2011, pp. 45–58). 
Another factor identified is inadequate manpower due to a large workload.   
Although the total number of contracting personnel remained relatively 
constant from FY1998 to FY2008, the workload carried by contracting 
personnel has grown significantly, while the average level of experience has 
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being available to process individual procurement actions and also suggests 
the size of the acquisition workforce is inadequate. (JAT, 2009, p. 4).   
Over the last ten years, the military has seen an increase in the percentage of 
the contracting workforce with 0–9 years of experience and 20+ years of experience, 
while there has been a decrease in the percentage of the group with 10–19 years of 
experience (see earlier discussion).  The middle group is responsible for much of the 
source selection process, and it is the smallest group proportionally in the entire 
contracting force.  It is possible that civilian contracting agencies and companies are 
snatching up this middle group as they come to the end of their initial military 
commitment by offering them better compensation than the military does.  This is a 
cause for concern within the contracting force because with such a large percentage 
of workers ready for retirement, the Defense Department could conceivably lose 
many of its experienced workers within a short time period. 
Closely related to the problem of inadequate manpower is inadequate training 
on source selection and the bid protest process.  “There is only one formal DAU 
training course directly focused on proper source selection procedures. This course 
is not mandatory, offered only online, and fails to capture any of the lessons learned 
from recent GAO protest decisions” (JAT, 2009, p. 4).  This lack of formal training 
puts Defense Department contracting officials at a disadvantage from the start of 
their careers because if they are not trained on how to recognize the common 
contracting pitfalls that often lead to protests, they will not be able to avoid them as 
easily in the future during the initial stages of the procurement process—ultimately at 
the cost of future DoD time, money, and manpower. 
A final contributor to the increase in the effectiveness rate is the loss of 
opportunity for the agency to learn from previous procurement mistakes in order to 
improve its performance in the future. 
There is currently no central repository for protest data or established forums 
for dialogue on protest related cases and trends in DoD.  The GAO does not 
publish detailed information on cases dismissed after voluntary corrective 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 94 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
difficult to ascertain the nature of the mistakes that were made in these 
procurements. (JAT, 2009, p. 4) 
In the 1980s, once the GAO formally issued a decision resolving a protest or 
an agency took corrective action, the GAO would write Secretaries of agencies with 
forward-looking recommendations on improving agency procurements.  Further, the 
GAO would compile and submit those recommendations to Congress in the GAO’s 
annual statutory reports on bid protests.94  However, “the GAO over time abandoned 
its statutory responsibility to make recommendations promoting compliance with 
procurement laws” (Spriggs & Kidalov, 2003).  As a result, neither the protesters, nor 
the Congress, nor the leadership of the Department of Defense can be assured that 
anti-competitive procurement practices, mistakes, and instances of misconduct are 
not repeated.  
Restoring the GAO’s statutory responsibilities on procurement improvement 
recommendations and creating a central repository for information on bid protests 
would be useful in order to ensure that current contracting officials have the most up-
to-date training possible by performing case studies of protest-related cases; it 
would also be very helpful for instructors in a protest-related source selection course 
to have contracting students perform case studies and learn from past mistakes in 
order to ensure better future performance. 
                                            
94 For example, the GAO Statutory Report on FY1985 Bid Protest Activity to the Honorable George 
Bush, President of the Senate, B-158766 (Jan. 31, 1986) reported that in two bid protests corrective 
action was either limited or not available, but the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of 
Agriculture were asked to take steps to prevent recurrence of violations in the future.  Both 
Secretaries agreed with these recommendations.  As a result, the Department of Agriculture 
admonished the contracting officer as to equal and fair treatment of offerors in best value 
procurements, and the Department of the Army took apparently procedural steps ensuring that sole 
source contracts are not awarded prior to the expiration of the required notice and waiting period.  
These remedies apparently vindicated the public interest without causing undue burden to agency 








After analyzing the data and observing trends, seven different hypotheses 
were formed on how to improve the bid protest process in order to save the DoD 
time, money, and manpower.   
A New Paradigm to Address Bid protests suggests that any proposal to 
reduce the rate of successful protests will involve either reducing the expected 
benefits of filing or litigating a protest, or increasing the expected costs (or some 
combination). 
First, better—not necessarily more—training for contracting officials with a 
focus on better attention to detail will result in fewer mistakes when soliciting 
contractors, which will lead to fewer protests.   
Second, if the Defense Department offers smaller, more frequent contracts, it 
will more often lead to contractors accepting the loss of an award as a learning 
experience; they will better prepare for future contracts instead of protesting the loss 
of the one current large procurement, a loss that  shuts them out of the market for a 
long time. 
Next, better tracking of protest information will enable researchers and 
auditors to periodically analyze trends and assure quality control of the procurement 
process. 
Also, by including a rating on companies that considers frivolous protest 
history as part of the past performance rating during the source selection process, 
the DoD could influence the company’s decision to protest unnecessarily in the 
event of losing a bid for a contract.  To pass constitutional muster and meet the 
principles of fundamental fairness, the criteria for this rating must strictly conform to 
the standards for frivolous protests set forth in Rule 11 of the Court of Federal 
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Strategically manage/reveal/report Settlements: Government agencies often 
voluntarily give aid to protestors; this contributes to the effectiveness rate.  If these 
agencies, specifically the DoD, stopped giving inappropriate voluntary aid to 
protestors before the GAO decision, they could reduce the spending of unnecessary 
resources in the event of a deny decision.  On the other hand, if agencies took 
corrective action or entered into ADR without unnecessary delays and for proper 
reasons, agencies would avoid disruptions from mandatory stays and avoid 
needlessly paying the protester’s legal expenses.  Congress and the agencies 
should consider making all bid protests settlements public.  
To better manage the protest process, agencies must require their acquisition 
managers to manage the protest process in a business-like manner by evaluating 
cost-benefit tradeoffs and decision steps in an appropriate and timely manner.   
Finally, ADR should be made the default dispute resolution mechanism in bid 
protests, and agencies should be required to file justifications as to why they have 
not successfully used ADR.  In addition, agencies should be required to justify their 
failure to use stay overrides and other flexibilities and defenses that would minimize 
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D. Recommendations to Reduce Risk of Protest 
Goals: 
1. Minimize fraud, favoritism, and corruption (build integrity, increase 
transparency, and improve accountability) 
2. Maximize competition (increase the expected value of participation in 
agency procurement-solicitation and award processes) 
a. Assumption: “As the number of bidders rises, competition 
increases and the purchase price falls” (MMR, 1991, p. 3). An 
exception in which restricting bidders makes sense would be a 
case in which an agency would waste resources on evaluating 
the bids of clearly non-performing firms or of those with clearly 
inferior (or ill-matched) products. TCE suggests that if the 
expected surplus (e.g., production cost savings) that a firm 
could offer is not sufficient to cover the transaction costs of 
preparing and evaluating a bid, then it should be excluded. 
(However, the contestable markets threat of entry theory by 
Baumol et al. [1982] might justify including some of these firms.) 
b. One option is to compensate all bidders for their bid preparation 
costs (CB) to promote participation by more bidders (since 
∂V*/∂CB < 0). In many complex and uncertain RFPs, bid 
preparation costs can be thought of as analogous to research 
and development costs.  This is especially suitable for small 
business concerns and new entrants to the Federal 
procurement market. 
c. Another option is to not only compensate the winner for 
production costs that were bid, but also to provide the winner 
with a profit related to its advantage over its next-best rival. The 
profit earned by the winner should depend on the gap between 
its bid and the second-best bidder to provide an incentive for the 
winner to bid more aggressively and to provide a higher value 
(surplus) product.  
d. Protests can reduce the winner’s profit by the costs (C3) 
required to defend against a protest (which might include 
settlement costs), where C3=f(E, F, CF, C1,C2). 
There is scant empirical evidence for judging what net effect the modern 
system of protest controls, including the CICA and related protest reforms, has had 
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A rent-seeking argument suggests that influence activities are attenuated by 
protests, but are there less disruptive alternatives? The protest mechanism reduces 
the rents from influence activities in two ways. First, a successful protest deprives 
the influence-seeking firm of a contract and forces it to pay protest costs. Second, a 
settlement forces the winner to share part of the profit from improper influence. The 
reduction in expected rents causes investment in influence activities to fall, thereby 
increasing the probability of an efficient award and reducing wasteful rent-seeking 
activities. 
E. Costs of Protests 
1. Cost and opportunity costs of protest authorities; and costs and 
opportunity costs of collecting and analyzing information. 
2. Cost and opportunity costs of resources used by protesting contractor, 
winning contractor and agency (prosecuting and defending protest): 
measure resources dedicated to personnel training, source selection, 
and defense of protests. 
3. Schedule delays (delivery of goods and services): measure time 
required to purchase and field equipment with and without protests. 
4. Reduced productivity and performance: measure user perception of 
quality and performance with and without protests. 
5. Bidders charge government a price premium to compensate for risk of 
protests (either having to initiate a protest or defend against one). 
6. Some government officials may be tacitly and improperly using the 
protest process to “buy a seal of approval” from the GAO for agencies’ 
procurement strategies, even at the risk of delays from mandatory 
stays and unnecessary legal expenses.  
7. Strategic manipulation of protest process as barrier to entry (force new 
entrants to face higher entry costs of protest), or incumbent can delay 
contract award with protest; or seek information to increase 
competitive advantage in subsequent procurements. 
8. Discourage government purchasing officials from exercising 
inappropriate discretion and considering important subjective factors 
when incomplete contracts cannot include all contingencies (past 
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criteria and relative weights, reduces subjective evaluation of vendor 
responsiveness, etc.). TCE: If agencies cannot write a complete 
contract, then vendors have incentives to shirk in the provision of those 
dimensions that are undervalued or not explicitly requested in the RFP. 
9. Bid rotation (bid rigging) cartel enforcement mechanism. “The protest 
enables cartel participants to challenge an award to a cartel member 
who [violates] the collusive agreement by bidding low ‘out of turn.’ The 
settlement process can facilitate efforts to extract side payments, 
including subcontracts (“greenmail”). 
10. Reducing protest risks could increase competition. Protests are bad for 
winners (they reduce expected benefits) and good for losers (they 
provide a second chance). Need grievances addressed to encourage 
participation, but also impacts the likelihood the winner will engage 
since it increases the cost of the transaction (defending against a 
protest and delays). The net effect on competition (increasing number 
of bidders) is an empirical question: attempt to assess the effect of 
protests on the number and quality of suppliers and on resources 
spent to obtain government contracts or to raise funds in capital 
markets. 
NOTE: The empirically small fraction of protests sustained suggests that 
agencies could more often appeal to urgent and compelling to override an automatic 
stay! 
NOTE: Increasing protestor costs by increasing data collection (breadth of 
evidence gathering) has two offsetting effects. On the one hand, it increases the cost 
of a protest, which tends to reduce incentives to protest. But on the other hand, it 
might also make the protest more valuable by increasing the ability of protestors to 
obtain information suggesting procurement flaws (increasing the probability of merit 
and sustained given merit), and revealing additional information that may be useful 
in future competitions, increasing the incentive to protest. 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Hypothesis: The increased risk of 
protests increases transaction costs. (Winners lose and losers win: Fraction of 
Responsible Winning Bidders opting out = f(Fraction of Contracts Protested)). 
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from the transaction. What are characteristics of transactions that tend to draw 
protests?  
Probit/Logit: Prob. of Protest = f(Complexity; Uncertainty; Frequency (length 
of contract; sequential contracts); Asset Specificity; Size of Contract; Purchase (split 
buy); Lease; Fee-for-Service; Alternative Opportunity; Settlement; Subcontract; etc.) 
F. Recommendations  
Transaction Costs Guidance— 
1. Reduce Asset Specificity 
2. Reduce Complexity—unbundle (invest in systems integration) 
3. Reduce Uncertainty 
4. Increase Frequency 
5. Increase Contestability 
6. Invest in Governance Mechanisms (Measurement, Monitoring & 
Oversight) 
Suggestions (Note: legal and regulatory impacts have not been determined) 
1. Demand Curves slope down: Make the prosecution of protest more 
difficult (reduce the probability of merit and of sustain given merit (PM 
and PS) and raise the costs of protests to reduce the volume of 
protests (CF, C1, C2). 
2. Apply a more deferential standard (a presumption of agency 
correctness that removes the automatic stay) similar to the standard 
for injunctions used at the Court of Federal Claims. 
3. Impose sanctions on frivolous protests in the manner of Rule 11 of the 
Court of Federal Claims. 
4. Limit the number of protests allowed in a given period or over a given 
set of contracts. Limit future protests and protest appeals if the first 
protest is strongly denied.  Again, these limitations should be modeled 
on traditional Rule 11 sanctions on repeated frivolous protest filings at 
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5. Restrict time limits to file protests, especially to ensure that post-award 
protesters do not obtain pre-award remedies of total recompetition. 
6. Increase financial costs of protests, e.g. by requiring bonds to 
compensate the government for the cost of stays similarly to Rule 65 of 
the Court of Federal Claims. 
7. Loser pays—reimburse the government and winning bidder for the 
legal fees and costs associated with defending the purchasing 
decision, including any costs from schedule delays, cost overruns, and 
performance shortfalls due to the automatic stay. Make stays 
discretionary by allowing the protestor to request (or not request) a 
stay since loser pays (C2). 
8. Amend the charter of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals 
by granting it the authority to administer and conduct ADR in bid 
protests. 
9. Competition among rival government forums (including inter-agency 
competition) can improve the quality, reduce costs, and make more 
alternatives available to protestors.  
10. Limit discovery tools (the ability of protestors to gather information) 
and/or use of discovered information so that protestors do not gain 
inappropriate competitive advantage over non-intervenors in future 
competitions. 
11. Limit remedies for successful protests to ensure no unfair competitive 
advantage and promote public interest (XA) 
12. Require exhaustion of administrative remedies (agency-level protests) 
before allowing GAO protests. 
13. Preserve the perception of institutional and political neutrality. 
14. Reduce the scope of protest oversight and increase the use of more 
cost-effective alternatives. 
15. Reduce overhead costs and defensive medicine costs associated with 
bid protests. 
16. Make it easier to assess the probable outcome of a protest. 
17. Establish a streamlined procedures for obtaining Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy or Department of Justice support for disagreement 
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18. Adoption of expeditious ADR as the default mechanism for resolving 
bid protests. 
19. Increase incentives and align the interests of government procurement 
officials so that they invest in human capital and effort in order to 
improve procurement outcomes.  Requiring agencies to justify failure 
to use ADR, stay overrides, or other protest resolution flexibilities 
should be the first step in this direction.  
20. Facilitate pre-award protests in order to reduce post-award protests, 
but be careful what you wish for. This could lead to multiple stays and 
constant interruption and delays in the procurement process. 
21. Impact of bid protest remedies in major cases should be subject to ex-
post evaluation on procurement outcomes (Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy or GAO Acquisition and Sourcing Management). 
22. Experiment with different levels of protest oversight and evaluate 
performance.  
a. Competition: Is the strength of protest oversight correlated with 
the willingness of buyers to do business with the government 
agency? 
b. Fraud, favoritism, and incompetence: What are the delays and 
value for money associated with protest oversight? 
This study offers several important insights and policy 
recommendations: 
1. A major challenge for the Defense Department is to reap the well-
intentioned benefits of protests while limiting their the unintended 
consequences (costs and disruptions).  
2. The costs of preventing or deterring inappropriate settlements is an 
additional transaction cost not clearly understood or appreciated in the 
current operation of the protest process. Evaluate the risk that protest 
systems might inadvertently motivate inappropriate settlements or 
inappropriate litigation strategies to protect procurement actions. 
3. The risk of Fed-mail and Buy-off settlements warrants a serious 
rethinking by the GAO of its protest effectiveness rate measure. It also 
cautions against departments, agencies, or Congress implementing 
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4. The data suggests that it may be appropriate (a) to overturn the implicit 
assumption that procurement officials (PO) are guilty until proven 
innocent that underpins the GAO’s current automatic stay of disputed 
procurements, and (b) to replace it with the assumption that POs are 
innocent until proven guilty. Under today’s binding regulations and 
statutes, this argues for departments and agencies to restrict stays (or 
injunctions) through more frequent use of (stay override) arguments 
such as “urgent and compelling circumstances” or “in the interest of the 
United States.” 
5. From the point of view of a protester, the economics approach 
suggests that there is no such thing as a frivolous lawsuit. A 
disappointed bidder will only file a protest if his expected benefits 
outweigh his expected costs. Frivolous lawsuits are an example of the 
strategic use of protests by firms when the reasons for protests are 
inconsistent with the public interest. 
6. In shaping protest policy, senior leadership should focus its attention 
on critical procurements—i.e., on those acquisitions likely to have the 
greatest impacts on investments and operations if they are protested—
and possibly, but not necessarily, on high-cost MDAPs. To help shape 
protest policies, focus on identifying  and addressing key factors and 
characteristics associated or correlated with successful protests of 
critical, high-impact procurements.  
7. Balancing the benefits of protests against the potentially significant 
(opportunity and transaction) costs suggests that there is an optimum 
rate of successful protests.  
8. Regardless of where the Department happens to be relative to the 
optimum, there exist policies to reduce successful protests that can 
actually increase competition. 
9. While selected policies that reduce Defense Department protest risks 
might increase risks faced by losing bidder types, hurting competition, 
they could reduce risks faced by winning bidder types, boosting 
competition. The net effect is an empirical question with enormous 
policy implications that warrants an empirical study to investigate this 
issue. 
10. Although a fear generally expressed in the legal and regulatory 
literature is that limiting protests will inhibit competition, resulting in 
higher costs, those costs could be more than offset by reductions in 
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11. The challenge is to choose an optimum mix of governance 
mechanisms that minimizes the costs of aligning incentives—to reduce 
the risk of fraud and errors and encourage competition—and that 
guarantees the best possible procurement outcomes for our troops and 
taxpayers. 
12. Ideally, policy initiatives to limit protests could be combined with other 
carefully selected, cost-effective governance mechanisms (internal 
audits, external audits, independent investigations, training 
investments, etc.) that reduce the need for the monitoring and 
oversight role of protests. 
13. The challenge is to choose the most cost-effective mix of initiatives that 
align incentives and that provide adequate monitoring and enforcement 
of procurements to reduce the risk of fraud and errors, and to 
encourage competition. In searching for alternative approaches, the 
optimum mix will include targeted investments in human capital as well 
as in centralized (audits and investigations) and decentralized (bid 
protests) third-party governance mechanisms. 
14. Because most agency protest decisions are not published, there is 
limited transparency, and the lack of a record of precedent deprives 
future protesters of the benefit of the agency’s reasoning on prior 
decisions. It also deprives agencies of the opportunity to learn from the 
process in order to improve their processes and procedures. A 
recommendation is for agencies to publish their protest decisions. 
15. GAO should again make recommendations to agencies on prospective 
improvements in their procurement processes following each bid 
protest where the protest was found meritorious or subject to corrective 
actions.  GAO should include those recommendations, as well as the 
most common grounds for sustaining protests, in its annual report to 
Congress. 
16. A recommendation is to seek a broader mix of reviewers for protests 
within the GAO that includes subject matter experts (SMEs) and 
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17. The operation of the current protest system reflects an assumption that 
the costs of protests are less than the costs of relying on alternative 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that would achieve the same 
policy goals (integrity, equity, efficiency) and “ensure the proper 
functioning of the procurement system, and to promote confidence in 
the system.” A recommendation is to evaluate the costs and benefits of 
alternative approaches that might improve procurement outcomes—
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VI. Recommendations and Areas for Further 
Research from the Companion Report, 
Better Acquisition Management through 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and 
Other Best Practices for Preventing and 
Resolving Bid Protests 
A. Recommendations 
1. Case for Fiscal Disincentives beyond Truly Frivolous Protests is 
not Demonstrated, But GAO Rules Must Include COFC-Style 
Sanctions   
Our research has revealed that agency personnel have strong opinions 
regarding the need for some type of disincentives for unsuccessful protestors.  The 
opinions range from “loser pays” scenarios, where the losing party to the protest 
must reimburse the other for the cost of the unsuccessful litigation, to more reserved 
opinions, where penalties are only assessed for those protests that are deemed to 
be truly frivolous. 
There is no doubt that the lack of disincentives for filing an unsuccessful 
protest may contribute to the litigious desires of a would-be protestor.  Nonetheless, 
we are not convinced that such disincentives are prudent, Constitutional, or conform 
to international obligations of the United States.  While such a procedure may very 
well reduce the negative impact frivolous protests have on the acquisition system, it 
may do so at the expense of legitimate protests.   Such disincentives may actually 
discourage participation in the federal contracting process and as a result 
competition may decrease. (GAO, B-401197, 2009, 13).  Further, in order to 
determine whether or not a protest is indeed frivolous, it would require additional 
action on the part of the GAO.   Currently, GAO determines initially whether or not a 
protest meets the requirements for filing a protest (timely, an interested party, etc.) 
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protest is sanctionable as frivolous, GAO would have to make a separate 
determination. This new determination may provide deterrence, but at the cost of 
additional litigation.  Further, unless carefully crafted, such disincentives or penalties 
will likely run afoul of the U.S. Supreme Court’s First Amendment protections for the 
right of free speech and the right to petition the government for the redress of 
grievances, or the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law.  For example, the 
Supreme Court held in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. National Labor Relations 
Board (461 U.S. 731 (1983)), that a Federal agency cannot halt lawsuits brought 
even for improper motives unless those lawsuits are based on “intentional 
falsehoods or on knowingly frivolous claims,” or otherwise lack a reasonable basis. 
In another case, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited (404 U.S. 508 
(1972)), the Supreme Court held that Federal antitrust laws may penalize 
businesses bringing lawsuits and petitions to Federal agencies only if such petitions 
and lawsuits are “a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an 
attempt to interfere directly with a business relationship of a competitor.”  Federal 
appellate courts also identified two limited ways which can render a legal action 
frivolous: “First, a legal action is considered ‘frivolous as filed’ when a plaintiff or 
appellant grounds its case on arguments or issues ‘that are beyond the reasonable 
contemplation of fair-minded people, and no basis for [the party’s position] in law or 
fact can be or is even arguably shown.’ . . . Second, a legal action is considered 
‘frivolous as argued’ when a plaintiff or appellant has not dealt fairly with the court, 
has significantly misrepresented the law or facts, or has abused the judicial process 
by repeatedly litigating the same issue in the same court.” (GAO, B-401197, 2009, 
11).  Any restriction, disincentives, or penalties for strategic protests against the 
public interest would have to meet the Federal courts’ stringent requirements.  
Finally, the United States agreed to provide effective bid protest mechanisms as part 
of the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement and 
agreed to effective non-discrimination in procurement as part of Reciprocal Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy Memoranda of Understanding. (Miller, 2009, 
93).  Care must be taken to ensure that any restrictions conform to our international 
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The U.S. Court of Federal Claims provides a useful model for sanctions 
against improper bid protests.  Under Rule 11 of the Rules of the Court of Federal 
Claims, a protester can be sanctioned only if the protest: 
(1)  is being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, 
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or 
reversing existing law or for establishing new law;  
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and  
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of 
information.    
Necessarily, a protestor would have some right to due process in order to 
“avoid punishing a company for filing a good-faith but unmeritorious protest.” (GAO, 
B-401197, 2009, 13).  This process may actually make the overall protest process 
longer, which could have potential negative impacts on the acquisition system.  
However, bringing the GAO Bid Protest Regulations to parity with COFC concerning 
sanctions for truly frivolous protests could provide a deterrent and, more importantly, 
address the perception that GAO may be welcoming frivolous protests.   
2. Standards for Mandatory Stay Overrides in CICA and Agency FAR 
Supplements Must be Clarified and Re-Balanced to Protect 
Taxpayers and the Troops, Not Just the Protesters 
Our research demonstrates that contracting agencies must be much more 
aggressive at issuing and defending overrides of mandatory CICA stays triggered by 
filing GAO protests.  At the same time, our research shows that the fault does not lie 
entirely with the agencies.  COFC interpretations of what CICA requires to sustain 
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important to the contracting agency, that of validity of contract awards.  These COFC 
interpretations seem to lack balance between the interests of the protesters and of 
the taxpayers, the troops, and Federal agencies.  Congress, the Comptroller 
General, and the Federal contracting issues should clarify and strengthen the CICA 
override standards.      
3. Agency-Level Protests Must Be Made More Transparent and 
Trustworthy to Be Truly Effective 
Our research reveals that experts in Federal agencies recognize the value of 
agency-level protests as a speedier, less costly, less adversarial alternative to 
litigation.  The Army Materiel Command experience is particularly instructive on this 
point.  However, contractors appear to distrust the agency-level protest process.  If 
Congress and the Executive Branch are serious about reducing litigation delays and 
costs, they may want to improve the transparency and trustworthiness of the 
agency-level protest process.  Specifically, CICA and FAR Part 33 may be amended 
to provide for greater disclosure of procurement information, mandatory impartial 
review above the contracting officer level, publication of agency-level protest 
decisions, and continuation of mandatory stays between agency-level protests and 
any subsequent GAO protests.  Once agency-level protests earn the trust of the 
Federal contracting community, it may be worthwhile to require contractors to 
exhaust their agency-level protest remedies before filing protests with the GAO or 
the Court of Federal Claims.   
4. ADRA Must Be Strengthened to Limit Grounds for Refusing ADR 
Our research reveals that at least some Federal agencies may be tacitly 
condoning or encouraging the litigation of bid protests at the GAO.  While ADRA 
allows the U.S. government to decline ADR in certain circumstances, our research 
shows that contracting agencies are litigating bid protests far more often than even 
the agencies themselves find appropriate.  In addition, our research reveals that 
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ADRA.  Congress should take steps to toughen ADRA in order to ensure that 
agencies are not “buying” GAO decisions with taxpayer funds.     
5. ADR Should Be the Default Dispute Resolution in Federal 
Procurement Protests  
Our research shows that the Executive Branch has extensive experience with 
ADR as the default bid protest resolution system.  Originally created as an 
exceptional experiment, the protest system at the Federal Aviation Administration 
ODRA demonstrated its ability to provide significant time savings and achieve 
protest resolution in a less disruptive manner than the GAO protests.  Congress 
should now take the FAA ODRA lessons and replicate them across the Federal 
government.     
6. Agencies Must Be Required to Vigorously Object to GAO Protests 
when Appropriate 
Related to the matter of frivolous protests are agency actions designed to 
properly document their objections to a protest.  The GAO “dismisses protests, 
where appropriate, without the need to resolve whether the protest was frivolous.” 
(GAO, B-401197, 12).  It is incumbent on agencies however, to object to protests 
when appropriate.   Our research revealed that many top acquisition and legal 
professionals believe frivolous protests frequently preclude effective resolution of bid 
protests.  Yet the very same individuals indicated that they believe their agencies 
infrequently raise vigorous objections in response to frivolous protests.  Indeed, the 
last recorded “frivolous protest” objection was reported by the GAO back in 1996.  
Since the GAO will dismiss protests that are frivolous or without merit, it is 
incumbent upon agency officials to raise objections to protests they deem to be 
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7. Agencies Must Provide Quality Mandatory and Non-Mandatory 
Debriefings to Prevent or Limit Strategic Protests 
Numerous survey respondents provided comments regarding the strategic 
reasons that may induce an unsuccessful offeror to file a protest.  One respondent 
called such protests “fishing expeditions” while another stated it was a means to 
“circumvent FOIA.”  Respondents’ rationale is that by filing a protest, even if 
ultimately unsuccessful, the protestor may obtain some information that he can later 
use to his advantage.  One means by which agencies can prevent such behavior is 
to provide a high quality debriefing, regardless of whether a debriefing is mandatory.   
If an unsuccessful offeror has been thoroughly debriefed as to why he was not 
selected for award, he may not feel he needs any additional information, and as a 
result he may be less inclined to file a protest.   A thorough debrief may also 
convince an unsuccessful offeror that he was in fact not prejudiced by the agency’s 
decision and therefore has no need to file a protest. 
Even with complete and thorough debriefings, some protestors will want to file 
a protest in order to seek information not otherwise available to them.  A change in 
agency policy could prevent this occurrence.   The information asymmetry that exists 
between the government and unsuccessful offerors may very well influence an 
offeror’s decision to protest.   Government agencies can prevent this from occurring 
by eliminating or reducing the asymmetry.   Information that is normally made 
available to an unsuccessful offeror only after having filed a protest should be made 
available to the offeror absent a formal protest filing.   This may eliminate one 
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8. Defense Agencies Should Object to GAO Recommendations 
Whenever Military Needs So Require, and the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy and the Department of Justice Should 
Streamline the Process for Supporting Federal Agencies When 
the GAO Gets It Wrong 
Our research revealed that Federal and especially defense agencies tend to 
follow the GAO blindly.  Significantly, not once did a defense agency refuse to follow 
GAO recommendations in order field equipment to the troops.  Agencies have 
traditionally feared Congressional sanctions for refusing to follow the GAO, but 
research proves that this fear is unwarranted.  Indeed, our research shows that 
during the 2009-2010 dispute between the GAO and the Department of Defense 
concerning the latter’s refusal to follow the former’s protest recommendations, the 
Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Justice, Congress, and the 
President took the side of the Department of Defense.  However, the process for 
agencies to secure high-level support against wrong GAO recommendations is not 
well-established within the Executive Branch.  The Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Council should make appropriate amendments.   
9. CICA and GAO Regulations Should Require Protesters to Post 
Bonds for the Cost of Interruption from CICA Stays  
Our review shows Federal agencies may not have sufficient tools to reduce 
costs and delays from mandatory CICA stays.  On the contrary, under Rule 65 of the 
Court of Federal Claims, “[t]he court may issue a preliminary injunction or a 
temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the 
court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found 
to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”  Further, under COFC Rule 65.1, 
“[t]he surety’s liability may be enforced on motion without an independent action.”  
Congress or the GAO should introduce similar rules in GAO bid protest in order to 
compensate the taxpayers for the costs of at least some protests that are ultimately 
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10. Agency Lawyers and Acquisition Workforce Must Be Trained to 
Resolve Bid Protests in Accordance with Least Disruptive Paths 
Our research reveals that opportunities abound to utilize ADR and other 
dispute resolution flexibilities even under current GAO Regulations, COFC Rules, 
and agency-level protest rules in FAR Part 33.  Unfortunately, our research also 
reveals that agency rarely utilize all the tools available to reduce delays and costs of 
bid protests.  In the beginning of this paper, we showed that it is possible to map out 
with great detail the least disruptive and most cost effective paths for resolution of 
bid protests, as well as related decision points.  Accordingly, we demonstrated that 
Federal contracting officials can manage the bid protest process in the same 
business-like manner as they manage other programs.  However, our survey data 
reveals significant gaps in the understanding of ADR and other flexibility tools by top 
Federal acquisition experts.  Therefore, it is imperative that agency protest resolution 
procedures and related training programs for the acquisition workforce be revised 
and improved in order to help contracting officers master the least disruptive and 
most cost effective resolution paths.  This is training is particularly important in 
military agencies, which are characterized by lower incidents of negotiation and 
other types of ADR than civilian agencies.   
11. To Reduce Protests, Federal Agencies Should Design Acquisition 
Strategies Promoting Maximum Possible Competition  
Our research shows that some of the most effective ways to prevent bid 
protests is to design competitive acquisition strategies.  These strategies involve 
breaking up large consolidated contracts into smaller contracts, including the 
awarding of multiple-award contracts instead of single-award contracts.  The 
substantive provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act at Title 10, Section 
2304, the Small Business Act at Title 15, Section 644, the anti-consolidation 
legislation in Title 10, Section 2382, and FAR Part 16.5 all compel emphasis on such 
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not only because that is required, but because doing so makes business sense and 
compensate the taxpayers through reduced protests and more efficiency.    
12. Federal Regulations Should Require Parties and Agency 
Acquisition Officials to Justify and Document Decisions not to 
Initiate or Use ADR, Stay Overrides, Express Options, Sanctions 
for Truly Frivolous Filings, and other Similar Tools 
Our review of the Federal Aviation Administration ODRA procedures 
highlighted the primary use of ADR to resolve protests.  We noted the fact that 
ODRA was able to resolve protests more quickly than when compared to the GAO’s 
bid protest process.  Within ODRA, there is an overriding presumption that parties 
will resolve protests through ADR.  If unable to utilize ADR, both parties must submit 
explanatory statements to the Dispute Resolution Officer.  The presumption that 
parties will utilize ADR, unless there is a countervailing reason to the contrary, is a 
primary driver behind ODRA’s processes.  The GAO in its regulations and the 
Executive Branch through the Federal Acquisition Regulation or agency 
supplements should adopt a similar procedural policy, and require each party to 
conduct cost-benefit analysis and affirmatively demonstrate why ADR cannot be 
utilized to resolve the protest.  Such a policy would likely reduce the time delays and 
costs an agency must endure during a bid protest.  Agencies should also be 
required to formally demonstrate why it does not seek dismissal as frivolous or 
meritless, sanctions, early corrective action, or stay overrides.  Any such justification 
documents must include business analysis that the costs of formal litigation under 
the regular process at the GAO and compliance with the GAO recommendations 
would outweigh the benefits of ADR and/or expedited procedures.  The analysis 
should take into account potential for disruption that can be created when a post-
award protester may seek a pre-award remedy of cancellation and change in the 
acquisition strategy.  Agencies should be proactive in initiating ADR and not wait 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 116 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
B. Areas for Further Research 
Our research has revealed a number of further areas of study that warrant 
additional research.  Specific areas of study include: 
 Analyze and document contractor motivation to file a protest.   Such 
research should include a thorough understanding of the business 
decisions that either constrain or enhance a contractor’s motivation to 
file a protest. 
 Conduct further analysis into debriefing procedures.  Best practices for 
conducting a successful debriefing need to be researched and 
documented. 
 Research into areas of strategy and practices that survey respondents 
cited with minimal frequency.  A number of these strategies and 
practices appear useful in mitigating the negative effect of reducing the 
impact of bid protests, yet they are underreported in our research.   
Further study into this area should be conducted. 
 Acquisition planning is cited the most commonly cited strategy or 
practice to minimize the impact of bid protests on the acquisition 
process.  Best practices for all facets of acquisition planning should be 
researched and documented. 
 The lack of financial disincentives for unsuccessful offerors was a 
highly cited policy that precludes the effective resolution or avoidance 
of bid protests.  Although we have previously stated our 
recommendation on this policy, we nonetheless feel that further 
research is warranted.   Specifically, research must be conducted into 
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